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Microprocessors are becoming increasingly susceptible to soft errors due to
the current trends of semiconductor technology scaling. Traditional fault-tolerant
multi-threading architectures provide good fault tolerance by re-executing all the
computations. However, such a full re-execution significantly increases the demand
on the processor resources, resulting in severe performance degradation.
To address this problem, this dissertation presents Active Verification Manage-
ment (AVM) approaches that utilize a checker hierarchy to increase its performance
with a minimal effect on the overall reliability. Based on a simplified queueing
model, AVM employs a filter checker which prioritizes the verification candidates so
as to selectively do verification. This dissertation proposes three filter checkers—
based on (1) result usage, (2) result bitwidth, and (3) result anomaly—that exploit
correctness-criticality metrics and anomaly speculation.
Binary Correctness Criticality (BCC) and Likelihood of Correctness Criticality
(LoCC) are metrics that quantify whether an instruction is important for reliability
or how likely an instruction is correctness-critical, respectively. Based on the BCC,
a result-usage-based filter checker mitigates the verification workload by bypassing
instructions that are unnecessary for correct execution. Computing the LoCC is
accomplished by exploiting information redundancy of compressing computation-
ally useful data bits. Numerical significance hints let the result-bitwidth-based fil-
ter checker guide a verification priority effectively before the re-execution process
starts. Extensive measurements prove that the LoCC yields quite a wide distribu-
tion of values, indicating that it has the potential to differentiate diverse degrees of
correctness-criticality.
A result-anomaly-based filter checker exploits a value similarity property, which
is defined by a frequent occurrence of partially identical values. Based on the bi-
ased distribution of similarity distance measure, this dissertation further investigates
another application to exploit similar values for soft error tolerance with anomaly
speculation. Extensive measurements show that the majority of instructions pro-
duce values that are different from the previous result value only in a few bits.
Experimental results show that the proposed schemes accelerate the processor
to be 180% faster than traditional fully-fault-tolerant processor, with a minimal
impact on the overall soft error rate. With no AVM, congestion at the checker
badly affects performance, to the tune of 57%, when compared to that of a non-
fault-tolerant processor. With good marking by AVM, the performance of a reliable
processor approaches that of a processor with no verification. These results explain
that the proposed AVM has the potential to solve the verification congestion problem
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1.1 New Challenges for Reliability in Microprocessors
Current technology trends pose new challenges for reliability in microproces-
sors. Microprocessor performance has been doubling every year and a half for the
past three decades, in part due to semiconductor technology scaling, and in part
due to innovations in computer architecture and accompanying software. Semi-
conductor technology scaling has resulted in larger numbers of smaller and faster
transistors and is likely to provide billion-transistor integrated circuits in the near
future. This comes, however, with a reduction in the critical charge required to
maintain proper device state. Such denser designs are more susceptible to perma-
nent and transient faults due to increased design complexity and reduced signal
integrity [40, 42, 43, 67].
There are three forces at work that introduce new reliability challenges in
VLSI fabrication technologies [4, 5, 40]. Finer feature sizes result in an increased
likelihood of noise-related faults, interference from natural radiation sources, and
huge verification burdens brought on by increasingly complex designs.
The first challenge is due to noise-related faults. They are the result of elec-
trical disturbances in the logic values in circuits and wires. As processor feature
size shrinks, interconnects become increasingly vulnerable to noise induced by other
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wires, which is called crosstalk. This effect is due to the increased capacitance and
inductance caused by densely packed wires. At the same time, designs are using
lower supply voltage levels to decrease power dissipation, resulting in even more
susceptibility to noise as voltage margins are decreased.
Secondly, there are a number of radiation sources in nature that can affect
the operation of electronic circuits. The two most prevalent radiation sources are
cosmic rays and alpha particles. Cosmic rays arrive from space. While most of
these rays are filtered out by the atmosphere, some occasionally reach the surface
of the earth, especially at higher altitudes. Alpha particles are created when atomic
impurities present in materials decay. When these energetic particles strike a very
small transistor, they can deposit or remove sufficient charge to temporarily turn
the device on or off, possibly creating a logic error. Energetic particles have been
a problem for DRAM designs since the late 1970’s when DRAM capacitors became
sufficiently small to be affected by energetic particles. It is difficult to shield against
natural radiation sources. Cosmic rays that reach the surface of the earth have
sufficiently high momentum that they can only be stopped with thick and dense
materials. Alpha particles can be stopped with thin shields, but any effective shield
would have to be free of atomic impurities; otherwise the shield itself would be
an additional source of natural radiation. Furthermore, the shielding approach is
not cost effective for most system designs. As a result, designers are likely to be
forced to adopt fault-tolerant design solutions to protect against natural radiation
interference.
Finally, the third challenge to reliability arises from increased design com-
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plexity. As designs becomes increasingly complex, their functionality and electrical
verification, under all possible combinations that work reliably in varied and occa-
sionally adverse operating conditions, becomes virtually impossible. At the moment,
chip vendors spend considerable resources—mostly 80% of design and fabrication
time—to verify the correct operation of parts and to avoid reliability hazards. There
is no shortage of testimonials from industry leaders warning that increasing com-
plexity is perhaps the most pressing problem facing future microprocessor designs.
Without improved verification techniques, future designs will likely be more costly,
take longer to design, and include more undetected design errors.
As a result, the degraded reliability is an important challenge in future gen-
erations of microprocessor design, and there is an increasing need for fault-tolerant
microarchitectures. Section 1.2 further describes soft error impact and its evidences.
1.2 Soft Error Impact and Evidences
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) arise when energetic particles, such as neutron
particles from cosmic rays and alpha particles from packaging material, generate
electron-hole pairs as they pass through a semiconductor device. Transistor source
nodes and diffusion nodes can collect these charges. A sufficient amount of accumu-
lated charge can invert the state of a logic device such as a latch, an SRAM cell, or
a gate, thereby introducing a logical fault into the circuit’s operation. Because this
type of faults do not reflect a permanent device malfunction, they are called soft or
transient [45]. Faults that arise from a permanent device malfunction are called
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hard or permanent [10, 56, 61].
A device’s rate of errors caused by SEUs depends on both the particle flux it
encounters and its circuit characteristics. The particle flux depends on the environ-
ment. In Denver, Colorado, for example, at an altitude of 1.5 km, the neutron flux
from cosmic rays is there three to five times higher than the flux at sea level [84].
Device circuit parameters that influence the error rate include the amount of charge
stored, the vulnerable cross-section area, and the charge collection efficiency. As
feature sizes shrink, the smaller amount of charge per device makes a particle strike
more likely to cause an error, but the reduced cross section makes a strike on any
given device less likely. These effects roughly cancel each other for latches and
SRAM cells. Thus, the error rate per latch or SRAM bit at a specific altitude will
remain roughly constant or decrease slightly for the next several technology gener-
ations. However, the chip error rate will grow in direct proportion to the number
of bits on the chip [45]. Thus, while Moore’s law gives us exponential transistor
count increases, this bounty comes at the cost of exponential error rate increases for
unprotected chips.
Soft errors caused by cosmic rays are already making an impact in industry.
Sun Microsystems acknowledged in 2000 that cosmic ray strikes on unprotected
cache memories had caused random crashes at major customer sites in its flagship
enterprise server line, losing a major customer to IBM as a result of this episode [6].
Numerous incidents of cosmic ray strikes had been reported after studying the error
logs of several large computer systems [46]. The fear of cosmic ray strikes prompted
Fujitsu to protect 80% of the 200,000 latches in its recent Sparc processor with some
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form of error detection [2].
Various techniques exist to deal with such faults, from special radiation-hardened
circuit designs [16], to localized error detection and correction such as parity and
ECC [2], to architectural redundancy [4, 54]. However, all these approaches intro-
duce a significant penalty in performance, power, die size, and design time. Con-
sequently, designers must carefully weigh the benefits of these techniques against
their cost. Although a microprocessor with inadequate protection from transient
faults might prove useless because of its unreliability, excessive protection can make
the resulting product uncompetitive in cost, performance, or power consumption.
Currently, the frequency of transient faults is low—typically less than one fault per
year per thousand computers—making fault tolerance not so attractive for general
purpose computers. However, the future microprocessors will be more prone to
transient faults due to their smaller feature sizes and higher frequencies. In the near
future, even low-end personal computing systems may need support for concurrent
fault detection and recovery.
1.3 Motivation
The primary objective of this research is to investigate techniques for incor-
porating fault tolerance without significant redundant hardware and without loss in
performance. Fault tolerance in itself is a research field with a long history. How-
ever, fault tolerance in microprocessors has recently got a fresh look from both the
industry and the academia for the above stated reasons. A number of novel fault tol-
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erance techniques, facilitated by other innovations in microarchitecture, have been
proposed recently.
Traditional dual-modular redundant and triple-modular redundant fault tol-
erance techniques involve replication of the hardware units, and executing multiple
copies of the software on these hardware units. The results produced by the mul-
tiple hardware units are compared with the help of comparators and voters, which
determine the correct result and identify the faulty units, if any. Such hardware-
redundant schemes have not been popular for commercial processors because of their
huge hardware overhead.
Several researchers have proposed a host of concurrent system-level fault tol-
erance techniques using watchdog timers, watchdog processors [7, 39, 58, 64, 71],
or re-execution processors [4, 27, 44, 48, 50, 51, 54, 68, 72, 83]. In watchdog tech-
niques, additional information on the program control flow is stored in the program
by means of signatures or checksums. At run time, watchdog processors recalcu-
late the signatures based on run-time control flow, and compare them against the
compile-time calculated signatures. They, however, require modifications to the in-
struction set architecture, and raise binary compatibility issues. Moreover, while
watchdog techniques are just for monitoring control flow errors, re-execution tech-
niques usually include an error recovery mechanism to detect and correct errors in
control flow as well as data values generated.
Redundant Multi-Threading (RMT) [44, 51, 54, 68, 72] and Dynamic Imple-
mentation Verification Architecture (DIVA) [4, 5] are recently proposed re-execution
approaches for concurrent error detection and recovery. RMT techniques provide
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fault detection by executing an instruction stream redundantly in separate thread
contexts and comparing execution results across the threads. For example, the
AR-SMT proposal [54]—the first work of RMT—assumes a baseline SMT processor
and enhances the front end of the SMT pipeline to replicate the fetched instruction
stream into two separate thread contexts. Both contexts then execute independently
and store their results in a reorder buffer. The commit stage is enhanced to com-
pare instruction outcomes and check for inconsistencies. Any such inconsistencies
are used to identify transient errors in the execution pipeline. In DIVA-like archi-
tectures, the computations done by an out-of-order processor core are verified by a
simple in-order checker processor. These full re-execution schemes redundantly exe-
cute each instruction, thereby significantly increasing the demand on the processor
resources and resulting in severe performance degradation [30, 35, 75, 77, 80].
Most of the previous studies have focused mainly on achieving reliability, with-
out paying much attention on the performance overhead incurred by re-execution.
Consider the DIVA proposal given in [4, 5]. This approach uses a simple in-order
checker processor, as depicted in Figure 1.1 (a). The checker dynamically checks
the computations of the regular (complex) processor. The regular processor core
supplies to the checker information concerning the executed instructions, such as
the input values and memory addresses referenced. The checker processor uses the
control and data dependency resolutions done by the regular processor. Therefore, it
is possible to trivially parallelize the checking activities. The checker processor only
needs to verify each instruction independently, by executing with the precomputed














Figure 1.1: Dynamic Verification Architecture: (a) Traditional DIVA, (b) Checker
Hierarchy.
8
processor core. Once each instruction is verified in this manner, then by induction
the entire instruction stream is verified. Thus, this arrangement covers design errors
as well as transient faults, with only a small amount of additional hardware.
However, dynamic verification with a simple and slow processor core does
have one limitation: the checker processor may impact the overall performance,
making it inviable for commercial processors. In other words, the throughput of the
pair of processor cores would be limited by the checker processor, if it is neither
fast nor wide enough to match the main processor [19]. Even though the checker
processor does not have to deal with control dependencies and data dependencies,
it may encounter some structural hazards because of design decisions geared to
reduce hardware cost or power consumption. The hardware resource limitation can
increase the checker’s latency and reduce its verification bandwidth. Because the
checker processor slows the progress of the main processor, the checker becomes a
performance bottleneck. We conducted some quantitative analysis to evaluate the
impact of checker’s congestion on the overall performance. These results, reported in
Section 4.3.1, confirm our hypothesis that the performance of a dynamic verification
processor is highly dependent on the bandwidth of the checker’s pipeline.
In order to be readily acceptable by processor manufacturers and customers,
fault tolerance schemes must satisfy [26]:
(1) Low hardware overhead.
(2) Low performance overhead.
(3) Good fault coverage.
The above stated goals are coincident with the primary objective of this study,
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which is to investigate techniques for incorporating fault tolerance without signifi-
cant redundant hardware, without much loss in performance, and with a minimal
impact on overall reliability. Therefore, this dissertation proposes a new Active Ver-
ification Management (AVM) approach with a filter checker to prevent the checker
from becoming a performance bottleneck (See Figure 1.1 (b)) [80].
1.4 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions.
• Sensitivity Analysis of Verification Congestion: Even though the
checker processor has no control dependencies and data dependencies, it may
have some structural hazards to reduce hardware cost or power consumption.
The checker’s congestion can be caused by increased latency or reduced band-
width due to hardware resource limitation. When the throughput of the core
processor exceeds the available bandwidth of the checker processor, the checker
processor cannot match the retirement bandwidth of the core processor. This
situation is called by verification congestion, which will be modeled as a sim-
plified queueing model. When the congestion happens, the performance gets
severely degraded and the role of the checker processor becomes important to
avoid congestion effectively in dynamic verification. This research will first
investigate the impact of checker’s congestion on the overall performance, es-
pecially when DIVA is employed.
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• Qualitative Analysis of Active Verification Management: This the-
sis proposes an Active Verification Management (AVM) approach to prevent
the checker from becoming a performance bottleneck. The problem with the
current dynamic verification is that it has no congestion management and just
stalls until the congestion is resolved. A possible solution for this problem is
the Active Verification Management (AVM) concept proposed in our study.
AVM is defined by a group of verification management mechanisms to support
congestion avoidance in reliable processors. There are two approaches of han-
dling congestion. One is a reactive way to play after the checker is overloaded.
Another is a proactive way to play before the checker is overloaded. Several
congestion avoidance policies will be discussed. The goal of AVM is to reduce
overloaded verification in the checker with a congestion avoidance policy and
to achieve minimal performance degradation incurred by congestion.
• Filter Checker Design and Its Quantitative Analysis: Before an in-
struction is verified at the checker processor, a filter checker marks a Correct-
ness Non-criticality Indicator (CNI) bit to indicate how likely its result is to
be unimportant for reliability. AVM uses the CNI information to realize a
congestion avoidance policy. Both reactive and proactive congestion avoid-
ance policies are proposed to mitigate the performance degradation caused by
the checker’s congestion. Based on a simplified queueing model, we evaluate
the proposed AVM analytically. Our experimental results show that AVM
has the potential to solve the verification congestion problem when perfect
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fault coverage is not needed. With no AVM, congestion at the checker badly
affects performance, to the tune of 57%, when compared to that of a non-
fault-tolerant processor. With good marking by AVM, the performance of a
reliable processor approaches 95% of that of a processor with no verification.
Although instructions can be skipped on a random basis, such an approach
reduces the fault coverage. A filter checker with a marking policy correlated
with the correctness non-criticality metric, on the other hand, significantly re-
duces the soft error rate. Finally, we also present results showing the trade-off
between performance and reliability.
• Measuring Correctness Criticality Exploiting Narrow Values: To ad-
dress the verification congestion problem, this thesis introduces a correctness
criticality based filter checker, which prioritizes the verification candidates
so as to selectively do verification. Binary Correctness Criticality (BCC)
and Likelihood of Correctness Criticality (LoCC) are metrics that quantify
whether an instruction is important for reliability or how likely an instruction
is correctness-critical, respectively. A likelihood of correctness criticality is
computed by a value vulnerability factor, which is defined by the numerically
significant bit-width used to compute a result. The proposed technique is
accomplished by exploiting information redundancy of compressing computa-
tionally useful data bits. Based on the likelihood of correctness criticality test,
the filter checker mitigates the verification workload by bypassing instructions
that are unimportant for correct execution. Extensive measurements prove
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that the LoCC metric yields quite a wide distribution of values, indicating
that it has the potential to differentiate diverse degrees of correctness crit-
icality. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme accelerates a
traditional fully-fault-tolerant processor by 1.7 times, while it reduces the soft
error rate to 18% of that of a non-fault-tolerant processor.
• Anomaly Speculation via Value Similarity Prediction: This disserta-
tion presents a pro-active verification management approach to mitigate the
verification workload to increase its performance with a minimal effect on
overall reliability. An anomaly-speculation-based filter checker is proposed
to guide a verification priority before the re-execution process starts. This
technique is accomplished by exploiting a value similarity property, which is
defined by a frequent occurrence of partially identical values. Based on the
biased distribution of similarity distance measure, this thesis investigates fur-
ther application to exploit similar values for soft error tolerance with anomaly
speculation. Extensive measurements prove that the majority of instructions
produce values which are different from the previous result value only in a
few bits. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme accelerates the
processor to be 180% faster than traditional fully-fault-tolerant processor with
a minimal impact on overall soft error rate.
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1.5 Road Map
The rest of dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explains the back-
ground of this study, which introduces redundancy based fault tolerance, recent
microarchitectural techniques for fault tolerance running the same thread in a sin-
gle chip, and a methodology measuring reliability to evaluate our proposed schemes.
Chapter 3 proposes the basic idea of Active Verification Management tech-
niques, models a dynamic verification process into a simplified queueing-theoretical
system, and gives some qualitative analysis results. To evaluate its performance and
reliability, we use a simulation-based platform. This experimental platform is also
presented in this chapter.
In Chapter 4, a result-usage-based filter checker is implemented to identify
correctness-non-critical instructions based on the previous qualitative analysis. This
chapter also investigates how much the checker’s congestion problem impacts the
processor performance. Experimental results show that the implemented filter
checker increases the overall performance with a minimal effect on the overall relia-
bility.
In Chapter 5, a result-bitwidth-based filter checker is proposed. Previous bi-
nary correctness criticality metric, presented in Chapter 4, is extended into a metric
based on value-based correctness criticality. To quantify how likely an instruction
is important for correct execution, the likelihood of correctness criticality is de-
fined. A methodology is also proposed to compute the metric. The proposed result-
bitwidth-based filter checker is accomplished by exploiting information redundancy
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of numerically significant bit-width. In other words, computationally useful data
bits are compressed by a dynamic significance compression technique.
Chapter 6 presents a result-anomaly-based filter checker using value similarity
prediction. This chapter observes a frequent occurrence of partially identical values
in the instruction stream and characterizes value similarity property. Based on its
biased distribution, similar values are applied for soft error tolerance with anomaly
speculation.
Chapter 7 compares the three filter checkers presented in previous chapters,
and discusses the impact of the proposed filter checker on reliability and hardware
complexity. It also discusses other potential applications of the proposed active
verification management technique.
Chapter 8 compares several related work with our work. Finally, Chapter 9




2.1 Redundancy Techniques for Fault Tolerance
Redundancy is the best technique to mask transient faults. The basic idea
behind any fault tolerance scheme is to have some form of redundancy [26, 27].
This redundancy can be in the form of additional hardware (hardware redundancy),
additional software (software redundancy), additional information (information re-
dundancy), or multiple execution of code on a single piece of hardware (time re-
dundancy). Of course, combinations of different types of redundancy can also be
employed.
Three key design questions for fault tolerance schemes are:
(1) For which components will the redundant execution mechanism detect faults?
Components that are difficult to verify due to complexity or sheer number of tran-
sistors having high susceptibility to transient faults must take part in re-execution.
(2) Which inputs must be replicated? Failure to correctly replicate inputs can
result in the divergent execution of redundant operations.
(3) Which outputs must be compared? Failure to compare critical values com-
promise fault coverage. On the other hand, needless comparisons increase overhead
and complexity without improving fault coverage.
To answer these questions, the concept of the Sphere of Replication (SoR) [51],
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which is defined by the logical extent of redundant execution, was introduced. The
sphere of replication abstracts both the physical redundancy as well as logical re-
dundancy. All activities and states within the sphere are replicated, either in time or
in space. Components within the sphere enjoy fault coverage due to the redundant
execution; components outside the sphere do not, and therefore, must be protected
via other means, such as information redundancy. Values that cross the boundary
of the sphere of replication are the outputs and inputs that require comparison and
replication, respectively.
2.1.1 Hardware Redundancy
Hardware redundant fault tolerance techniques involve replication of the hard-
ware units, and executing multiple copies of the software on these hardware units.
The results produced by the multiple hardware units are compared with the help of
comparators and voters, which determine the correct result and identify the faulty
units, if any. Examples of such schemes are dual-modular redundancy and triple-
modular redundancy. Hardware redundant schemes have not been popular for com-
mercial processors because of their hardware overhead. It is also known as space
redundancy.
2.1.2 Information Redundancy
Information redundancy techniques involve adding additional information to
the existing information. Examples are (1) Error-Correcting Code (ECC) for cross-
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checking the contents of I-cache, D-cache, register file, and main memory, (2) control
flow based signatures for cross-checking run-time control flow, and (3) algorithm-
based checksums for cross-checking the generated data values.
ECC is based on systematic application of redundancy to information. That
is, in a set of all possible combinations of symbols, only a subset of combinations,
called code words, are allowed to be valid combinations so that the occurrence of
an error most likely changes it into a non-code word. In control flow checking,
additional information on program control flow is stored in the program by means
of signatures or checksums. At run time, external devices called watchdog timers
or watchdog processors re-calculate the signatures based on run-time control flow,
and compare them against the compile-time calculated signatures. This technique
detects control flow errors that result in the execution unit taking a path that is
not present in the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of the executed program. However,
control flow errors due to conditional branches taking incorrect decisions are not
detected, because the incorrect paths so taken are still contained in the CFG.
2.1.3 Time Redundancy
Time redundancy involves re-executing a piece of code or an operation using
the same piece of hardware, and comparing the two sets of results. At the proce-
dure level, the proposed time redundancy methods are: (1) rollback and recovery
schemes employing recovery block and check-pointing methods, and (2) N-version
programming. At the instruction execution and data transmission level, the meth-
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ods that have been proposed are based on instruction re-execution, re-transmission
of data, alternating logic, and re-computation of shifted operands. Recently, several
software fault tolerance techniques have been proposed [47, 52, 53].
2.1.4 Exploiting Existing Hardware Redundancy
In high performance processors that exploit some form of parallelism, hard-
ware redundancy in some form is already provided for exploiting concurrency. For
example, vector processors routinely pipeline each functional unit heavily. VLIW
processors even provide multiple copies of the same hardware functional unit with
a view to achieve high peak performance. Multiprocessors provide multiple copies
of the processing element to exploit parallelism at a coarser level. Any time extra
hardware is thrown in for improving the performance, there is a good chance that
the utilization of the hardware becomes low. For instance, in superscalar processors,
not all stages of the functional unit pipelines may be busy during every clock cycle.
This makes it particularly attractive to employ time redundancy by making use of
the redundant hardware in superscalar processors. Similarly, in multiprocessors,
not all processors may be active all the time, and this redundancy can be used for
executing identical copies of programs.
Recent commercial single-chip multithreading processors allow concurrent ex-
ecution of multiple threads in a single chip by maintaining multiple on-chip hard-
ware contexts. Running multiple threads in a single chip gives an opportunity to
implement fault tolerance schemes that exploit existing hardware redundancy. This
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architecture effectively utilizes the ever-increasing hardware budget available in a
single chip. In addition, this architecture is a cost-effective way of exploiting Thread-
Level Parallelism (TLP) because it allows some of the on-chip hardware resources
to be shared between concurrently running threads, rather than dedicating them to
individual threads.
Depending on the design of the single-chip multithreading processors, the
choice of the dedicated and shared hardware resources varies. Two extremes of
single-chip multithreading processor design are Chip Multi-Processor (CMP) and
Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) processor. SMT allows the execution of mul-
tiple threads in a single core by letting fine-grained sharing of most of the processor
resources, as well as the L1 cache and the L2 cache between concurrently running
threads. The only resources dedicated to each thread are the program counter and
additional storage to maintain context information. CMP has multiple processor
cores in a single chip. Each core has its own dedicated processor resources, in-
cluding branch predictor, fetch queue, issue queue, functional unit, memory port,
register file, and reorder buffer, to execute a thread. However, multiple cores share
the on-chip L1 and/or L2 caches.
SMT can utilize the processor resource more efficiently because SMT allows
one thread to use almost all of the shared resources when the other thread(s) cannot
fully utilize them. SMT achieves higher per-core throughput by exploiting paral-
lelism between independent threads. However, the increased processor throughput
comes at the expense of single-thread performance. Because multiple threads share
hardware resources at the same time, individual threads get fewer resources than
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what they would have received if they had been running alone.
On the other hand, the multiple cores in a CMP are duplicates of a single
core. Since each core in CMP is independent of each other, increasing the number
of cores in a chip does not severely increase the complexity of the interconnections
within a chip, making it more scalable. CMP may have either heterogeneous cores,
with either powerful out-of-order processor core(s) mixed with simple small in-order
processor core(s), or homogeneous cores.
Due to these advantages of single-chip multithreading processor design, many
CMP and SMT processors are commercially available nowadays. Intel Pentium4
with Hyper-threading is an SMT product. IBM Power4, AMD Athlon64 dual core,
Intel Pentium dual core, and Intel Pentium quad core are all CMP products. IBM
Power5 architecture has two SMT cores in a single chip, making it a hybrid of both
SMT and CMP.
2.2 Running the Same Thread in a Single Chip
An alternative of running multiple threads that several researchers have pro-
posed is to execute the same instructions in multiple contexts [57]. Although it may
seem counter-intuitive, there are several potential benefits to such an approach. The
first proposal to suggest doing so, Active-stream/Redundant-stream Simultaneous
Multi-Threading (AR-SMT), focused on fault detection. By executing an instruc-
tion stream twice in separate thread contexts and comparing the execution results
across the threads, transient faults in the processing pipeline can be detected. In
21
other words, if the pipeline hardware flips a bit due to a soft error in a storage cell,
the likelihood of the same bit being flipped in the redundant stream is very low.
Comparing results across threads will likely detect many such transient faults.
The AR-SMT proposal assumes a baseline SMT processor and enhances the
front-end of the SMT pipeline to replicate the fetched instruction stream into two
separate thread contexts. Both contexts then execute independently, and store their
results in a reorder buffer. The commit stage of the pipeline is further enhanced
to compare instruction outcomes, as they are committed, to check for inconsisten-
cies. Any such inconsistencies are used to identify transient faults in the execution
pipeline. A similar approach is used in real processor designs that place emphasis on
fault detection and fault tolerance. For example, the IBM S/390 G5 processor also
performs redundant execution of all instructions, but achieves this by replicating
the pipeline hardware on chip and running both pipelines in lock step [63]. Similar
system-level designs were available from Compaq’s Tandem division. In these de-
signs, two physical processor chips are coupled to run the same threads in a lockstep
manner, and faults are detected by comparing the results of the processors to each
other.
An interesting observation grew out of this AR-SMT study, say the active and
redundant streams end up helping each other execute more efficiently. This cooper-
ative behavior has been exploited by prefetching memory references and resolving
branch mispredictions for each other [22, 69, 70] via critical path instructions. One
positive side effect of redundant execution is prefetching because both threads are
generating the same stream of instruction and data memory references. Whenever
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one thread runs ahead of the other, it prefetches useful instructions and data into the
processor’s caches. This can result in a net speedup, since additional memory-level
parallelism is exposed. Another main benefit of redundant execution is early reso-
lution of branch instructions that are hard to predict with conventional approaches
to branch prediction. Figure 2.1 illustrates these uses for running the same thread
in a single chip. Figure 2.1 (a) shows how a runahead thread can prefetch cache
misses and resolve branch misprediction for the main thread, while Figure 2.1 (b)
shows how a redundant thread can be used to check the main thread for transient
faults.
Both Redundant Multi-Threading (RMT) and Dynamic Implementation Ver-
ification Architecture (DIVA) processors, which will be introduced in Sections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2, respectively, build on the AR-SMT concept and pursue potential benefits
of fault detection as well as pre-execution.
2.2.1 Redundant Multi-Threading
Redundant Multi-Threading (RMT) uses two threads running the same pro-
gram on an SMT processor [29, 44, 51, 54, 68, 72]. Program-level time redundancy
effectively doubles the execution time of a program because the same program is
run twice back-to-back. As the programs are run sequentially there is great per-
formance loss. SMT is identified to provide time redundancy using re-execution as
well as providing a performance boost to fault tolerant architectures by maximizing
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(a) Pre-execution (b) Fault detection
Figure 2.1: Comparison of Pre-execution and Fault Detection: (a) pre-execution,
(b) fault Detection [57].
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instructions each cycle to a superscalar processor’s functional units. This dynamic
sharing of the functional units allows SMT to substantially increase throughput,
attacking the two major impediments to processor utilization —long latencies and
limited per-thread parallelism.
In Redundant Multi-Threading (RMT), two explicit copies of the same pro-
gram run concurrently on the same processor resources. The two copies are treated
as completely independent programs, each having its own state or program context.
Consequently, as with program-level time redundancy, the entire pipeline of the pro-
cessor is conceptually duplicated, providing broad coverage of the chip. RMT uses
SMT’s multithreaded execution to replicate an application into two communicating
threads, one executing ahead of the other. Comparing the results of two redundant
executions is the underlying scheme to detect transient faults in RMT.
RMT being based on the concept of SoR entails that (1) all computation and
data within this sphere are replicated such that each thread uses its own copy,
(2) data entering the SoR is independently read by the two threads using input
replication, (3) data exiting the SoR from the two threads are compared using
output comparison, and only one copy of the checked data is stored outside the
SoR. Both RMT and DIVA processors encompass the processor core as their Square
of Replication (SoR).
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2.2.2 Dynamic Implementation Verification Architecture
The DIVA processor also builds on the AR-SMT concept, but instead of us-
ing two threads running on an SMT processor, it adds a simple in-order checker
processor that dynamically checks the computations of a regular out-of-order pro-
cessor by re-executing the instruction stream [4, 5, 19, 18, 49]. The main motive
in adding a checker processor is to provide dynamic verification as compared to the
static verification employed in contemporary designs. The basic idea is to make
the execution of the main processor speculative and then verifying the speculative
results using a checker. To implement dynamic verification, a microprocessor is
constructed using two heterogeneous internal processors that execute the same pro-
gram. The main processor is responsible for pre-executing the program to create
the prediction stream. The prediction stream consists of all executed instructions
delivered in program order with their input values and any memory addresses refer-
enced. The checker processor follows the regular processor, verifying the activities
of the main processor by re-executing all program computation in its wake. The
checker processor is assumed to be correct since its simple design lends itself to easy
verification. The speculative stream from the main processor serves to simplify the
design of the checker processor and speed its processing. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
DIVA proposal.
Pre-execution of the program on the complex regular processor eliminates all
the processing hazards, for example branch mispredictions, cache misses, and data
dependences, that slow simple processors and necessitate complex microarchitec-
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic Implementation Verification Architecture [4].
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ture. By removing all dependences in the checker, the code running on the simple
processor can be parallelized. The simple processor need only verify each instruc-
tion in isolation, by executing with the provided inputs and comparing the output
to the provided output. Once each instruction is verified in this manner, then, by
induction, the entire instruction stream is also verified. In the event the main pro-
cessor produces a bad prediction value due to a design error, the checker processor
will detect the bad value and flush all internal state from the main processor and
restart it after the errant instruction. Once restarted, the main processor will re-
synchronize with the correct state of the machine as it reads register and memory
values from non-speculative storage. The resulting dynamic verification architec-
ture should therefore benefit from a reduced burden of verification, because only
the checker needs to be built correctly. Since the simple processor is by defini-
tion easy to verify for correctness, it can be trusted to check the operation of the
much more complex and design-error-prone runahead processor. Hence, the checker
processor will fix any errors in the main processor.
For dynamic verification to be viable, the checker processor must be simple
and fast. It must be simple enough to reduce the overall design verification burden,
and fast enough to not slow the main processor. A single issue two-stage checker
processor is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The checker processor has two modes—the
CHECK mode and the RECOVER mode. When the main processor retires an
instruction, the checker pipeline receives an instruction with main processor pre-
dictions. These predictions include the next PC, instruction, instruction inputs,
and addresses referenced for loads and stores. The checker processor ensures the
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Figure 2.3: Single-wide Checker Processor Pipeline [4].
correctness of each component of this transfer by using four parallel stages, each of
which verifies a separate component of the prediction stream. Each parallel stage
implements a substep of instruction execution and verifies whether the computed
value is identical to that received from the main processor. If each prediction from
the core processor is correct, the checker processor is allowed to retire the instruction
to non-speculative storage in the commit stage of the checker processor.
In the event any prediction information is found to be incorrect, the checker
enters the RECOVER mode. The bad prediction is fixed, the main processor is
flushed, and restarted after the errant instruction. The main processor’s flush and
restart use the existing branch speculation recovery mechanism contained in all
modern high-performance pipelines. In the recovery mode, the pipeline is recon-
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figured into a serial pipeline, very similar to the classic five-stage pipeline. In this
mode, stage computations are sent to the next logical stage in the checker processor
pipeline, rather than used simply to verify main predictions.
Unlike the classic five-stage pipeline, only one instruction is allowed to enter
the recovery pipeline at a time. As such, the recovery pipeline configuration does
not require bypass datapath or complex scheduling logic to detect hazards. Once
the instruction has retired, the checker processor reenters normal processing mode
and restarts the main processor after the errant instruction. An important aspect
of the checker design is that the CHECK mode and the RECOVER mode use the
same checking modules, thereby reducing the area cost of the checker and its design
complexity.
At first glance, the simple checker processor may seem to be able to easily keep
up with the main processor because it exploits the fact that the regular processor has
speculatively resolved all control flow and data flow dependences. In fact, however,
if the checker processor runs slower or it does not support a wider pipeline than the
main processor, the checker becomes the execution bottleneck. That is to say, the
throughput of the pair of processors would be limited by the simpler one, resulting in
poor performance. In the original DIVA proposal, there are three ways the checker
processor can slow the progress of the main processor. First, any contention for the
ports between the checker and main processors will lead to main processor stalls.
Second, the checker processor pipeline delays the retirement of instructions, forcing
the main processor to hold speculative state longer, thus creating back-pressure at
retirement. If speculative state resources fill, the core processor decoder will stall as
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Figure 2.4: Limitation of Dynamic Verification: (a) no performance loss in steady
state, (b) performance loss due to checker’s congestion.
it will not be able to allocate reorder buffer and load/store queue resources. Finally,
checker processor cache misses stall the entire checker pipeline, which again can lead
to increased pressure on the main processor speculative state.
As stated above, in the DIVA processor, the checker processor may have a
significant impact on the overall performance, making it inviable for commercial
processors. Figure 2.4 illustrates the limitation imposed by the checker’s conges-
tion. In this dissertation, Section 4.3.1 further analyzes the impact of congestion
in the checker processor. Although this quantitative study mainly deals with the
performance bottlenecks in the DIVA processor, RMT processors similarly incur a
noticeable performance penalty because the main thread shares its resource with
the redundant thread.
2.3 Measuring Reliability
2.3.1 Computing a Processor’s Soft Error Rate
A processor’s Soft Error Rate (SER) is classified into two categories, which are
Silent Data Corruption (SDC) and Detected Unrecoverable Error (DUE) [76]. SDC
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occurs when an unprotected bit sustains a single bit upset leading to undetected
incorrect system behavior. In contrast, a DUE event occurs when an error in a bit
is detected, but the system cannot recover from that error. This dissertation mainly
focuses on SDC and refers SER to SDC error rate hereafter.
A key aspect of generating SER estimates is that not all faults in a microarchi-
tectural structure affect a program’s final outcome. As a result, an estimate based
only on raw device fault rates will be pessimistic, leading architects to overdesign
their fault-handling features. The probability that a fault in a processor structure
will result in a visible error in a program’s final output is called that structure’s Ar-
chitectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) [45]. AVF ranges from 0 to 1. For example,
a single bit fault in a branch predictor will not affect the results of any committed
instructions, and so the branch predictor’s AVF is 0. In contrast, a single bit fault
in the Program Counter (PC) will cause the wrong instructions to execute, almost
certainly affecting the program’s result; hence the PC’s AVF is effectively 1.
The overall SER of a microarchitectural structure is the product of its raw fault
rate and its AVF. By summing the contributions of all on-chip structures, a processor
architect can map the raw fault rate to an overall processor SER and thus determine
whether the design meets its SER goals set for the target market. Significantly, this
lets the architect examine relative contributions of various structures and identify
the most cost-effective areas in which to use fault protection techniques.
To estimate AVFs [9, 45, 82], we use an approach that tracks the subset of
processor state bits required for Architecturally Correct Execution (ACE)—any exe-
cution that generates results consistent with a system’s correct operation as observed
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by a user. Any fault in a storage cell that contains one of these bits, called ACE
bits, will cause a visible error in a program’s final output in the absence of error
correction techniques. The remaining processor state bits are called un-ACE bits
because their specific values are unnecessary for architecturally correct execution.
A fault that only affects un-ACE bits will not cause an error. The AVF of a single
bit storage cell is simply the fraction of time that it holds ACE bits. Assuming that
all cells have equal raw fault rates, a structure’s AVF is the average of its storage
cells or the average fraction of its cells holding ACE bits at any time.
The branch predictor’s AVF is thus 0 because all predictor bits are always un-
ACE bits. Similarly, all the bits in the PC are always ACE bits, leading to its AVF
of 1. The real power of ACE-bit analysis lies in computing the AVFs for structures
that hold ACE bits at some times and un-ACE bits at other times. Rather than
enumerating for each structure which bits might matter and which might not, the
ACE bits are simply determined in the pipeline, the average number of ACE bits
in each structure in each cycle is determined, and the ratios of these numbers to
the structure’s bit capacities are obtained. The average ACE bits can be used for
this calculation because fault-inducing particle strikes are randomly and uniformly
distributed in a structure.
Using this performance model, the ACE bits in a structure are directly counted.
A structure’s AVF can also be estimated by counting the ACE bits that flow through
the structure and then applying the Little’s law, which states that the average capac-
ity of an open system is the product of the bandwidth of individual objects flowing
through the system and the average residence time of each object in the system [8].
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It is difficult to precisely classify ACE and un-ACE bits over a program’s en-
tire execution. Instead, it is assumed conservatively that every bit is an ACE bit
unless it can be proved to be un-ACE. Thus, an upper bound of the AVF number is
computed by obtaining a conservative estimate of a processor’s AVF. Five sources
of architectural un-ACE bits has been identified—(1) nop instructions, (2) perfor-
mance enhancing instructions such as prefetches, (3) predicated-false instructions,
(4) dynamically dead instructions, and (5) logically masked instructions. The results
of dynamically dead instructions either are never used by any subsequent instruction
in a program or are used only by other dynamically dead instructions [15]. Most of
bits of such instructions can be classified by un-ACE, except the opcode and some
specific bits, when they are stored in processor structures.
With the Little’s law, the average number of ACE bits resident in a structure
and therefore the structure’s AVF can be computed. The Little’s law is translated
by N = B × L, where N is the average number of bits in a processor structure, B
is the average bandwidth of bits per cycle into the structure, and L is the average
residence time of an individual bit in the structure. Applying this equation to ACE
bits, the average number of ACE bits in a structure is obtained by the product of
the average bandwidth of ACE bits going into the structure (BACE) and the average
residence cycles of an ACE bit in the structure (LACE). Thus, the structure’s AVF
can be expressed as
BACE × LACE
Total number of bits in hardware structure
(2.1)
This formulation is particularly useful in the very early stages of an industrial
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processor’s design cycle when even a performance model may not be available. Al-
ternatively, in many cases, hardware performance counters can be used to compute
the bandwidth of ACE bits going into a structure and the average residence cycles
of ACE bits, allowing AVF estimation without a performance model.
2.3.2 Computing Mean Instructions To Failure (MITF)
Traditionally, the fault tolerance community has used the terms MTBF (Mean
Time Between Failures) and MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) to reason about er-
ror rates in processors and systems. These are usually expressed in years. Typ-
ically, MTTF corresponds to system uptime and is related to MTBF as follows:
MTBF = MTTF + MTTR, where MTTR is the mean time to repair. Because
MTTF is usually orders of magnitude greater than MTTR, people often use MTBF
and MTTF synonymously. Nevertheless, MTTF is a more appropriate term for
processor vendors, such as Intel and AMD, because such vendors do not have con-
trol over system-level MTTR-related features, which typically reside outside the
processor chip.
While MTTF provides a metric for error rates, it does not allow us to reason
about the trade-off between error rates and the performance of a processor. The
concept of MITF (Mean Instructions To Failure) has been introduced as an approach
to reason about this trade-off [76]. MITF tells us how many instructions a processor
will commit, on average, between two errors. MITF is related to MTTF as follows:
MITF =
number of committed instructions




number of committed instructions
total execution time in cycles
frequency×MTTF
(2.3)
= IPC × frequency × MTTF (2.4)
For example, a processor running at 2 GHz with an average committed Instructions
Per Cycle (IPC) of 2 and MTTF of 10 years would have a MITF of 1.3 × 1018
instructions.
A higher MITF implies a greater amount of work done between errors. As-
suming that, within certain bounds, increasing the MITF is desirable, the MITF can
be used to reason about the trade-off between performance and reliability. Since
MTTF = 1raw error rate×AV F , we have:
MITF =
IPC × frequency









Thus, at a fixed frequency and raw error rate, MITF is proportional to the ratio
of IPC to AVF. It can be argued that mechanisms that reduce both the AVF and
the IPC may be worthwhile only if they increase the MITF. In order words, if they
increase the IPC-to-AVF ratio by reducing the AVF relative to the base case to a
greater degree than they reduce the IPC.
Although the MITF can be used to reason about performance versus AVF for
incremental changes, we need to be cautious not to misapply it. For example, it
could be argued that doubling processor performance while reducing the MTTF by
50% is a reasonable trade-off, as the MITF would remain constant. However, this




Active Verification Management Approach
This dissertation proposes an Active Verification Management (AVM) ap-
proach to prevent the checker from becoming a performance bottleneck, as illustrated
in Figure 1.1 (b) [77]. This chapter presents the basic idea of AVM in Section 3.2.
The AVM is abstractly formulated as a simplified queueing model in Section 3.1 and
qualitatively analyzed in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 describes our simulation
methodology.
3.1 A Simplified Queueing Model
The dynamic verification process can be viewed as a verification queue that
services jobs that are submitted by the main processor core, as shown in Figure 3.1.
Completed instructions in the reorder buffer of the main processor are waiting to
be verified by the checker. The number of waiting instructions depends on the
processing speed and bandwidth of the checker. Therefore, a dynamic verification
architecture can be modeled as a simplified queueing system.
The main processor core is assumed to complete instructions at an average
rate of λ and the verification queue is assumed to service jobs at an average rate of
µ. The utilization factor ρ is defined by λ
µ
, which can be interpreted by the fraction
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Figure 3.1: A Simplified Model of Dynamic Verification Process.
the arrival rate, and there is no performance degradation. However, if ρ > 1, then
verification congestion happens and the checker cannot keep up with the retirement
bandwidth of the main processor. In steady state, the average number of instructions
waiting in the reorder buffer and the average residence time of instructions in the
reorder buffer then increases. Therefore, this dissertation presents a novel approach,
which controls the verification activity executed at the checker processor, to mitigate
the performance degradation caused by the checker’s congestion. To illustrate the
effectiveness of using AVM, Section 3.3 qualitatively analyzes the simplified queueing
model.
3.2 Basic Idea
When the throughput of the main processor exceeds the available bandwidth of
the checker processor, the checker processor cannot match the retirement bandwidth
of the main processor.
When congestion happens at the checker, the performance is severely affected.
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Figure 3.2: Active Verification Management.
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The problem with current simple verification schemes is that they have no congestion
management and just stall the main processor until the congestion is resolved. We
propose Active Verification Management (AVM) as a solution to this problem. AVM
is defined by a group of verification management mechanisms to support congestion
avoidance in fault-tolerant processors. We present two approaches of handling con-
gestion. One is a reactive way to play after the checker is overloaded. Another is
a proactive way to play before the checker is overloaded. Both of these policies are
discussed in detail in Section 4.2. The proposed AVM covers design faults as well as
soft errors in control logic, processor storage structures such as the register file and
reorder buffer, and the functional units. Errors occurring in the checker processor
can also be corrected as long as the same error does not occur in both the main and
checker processors.
The goal of AVM is to reduce overloaded verification in the checker with a
congestion avoidance policy and to achieve minimal performance degradation when
congestion occurs. The basic idea is similar to that of a cache hierarchy. Since a small
cache is fast and a fast cache is expensive, a cost-effective hierarchical solution can
be achieved to obtain both fast speed and large size by using the principle of locality.
In our AVM proposal, a flag called Correctness-Noncriticality Indicator (CNI) bit is
associated with each instruction to indicate if its result is non-critical from the overall
correctness point of view. The filter checker implementation to identify correctness-
noncritical instructions is described in Section 4.1. Once the CNI bit is updated for
an instruction, AVM decides how to deal with the identified instructions by using
a congestion avoidance policy (described in Section 4.2). For example, marked
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instructions may be directly passed to the commit stage by skipping verification,
while un-marked instructions may proceed to the second-level checker for further
verification.
3.3 Qualitative Analysis of the AVM Model
Because this study focuses on the case when the checker’s congestion happens,
let us assume that ρ > 1 in the simplified queueing model. We further assume that
the performance of reliable processors should be kept the same as that of non-fault-
tolerant processors to evaluate the proposed AVM analytically. If the verification
queue cannot be allowed to overflow in the proposed AVM model, then the utilization
factor should be less than 1. This gives an upper bound on the fault coverage to
analyze the effectiveness of various AVM schemes.
Definition 3.1 The fault coverage is defined by the success probability that the faulty
instructions are verified by the checker.
Lemma 3.1 The fault coverage of random marking is bounded above by 1
ρ
.
Proof If AVM randomly skips each instruction with probability ps, then the uti-
lization factor becomes (1 − ps)ρ. According to the above condition, say with
ρ < 1, ps should be chosen such that ps > 1 −
1
ρ
. The event that any soft
error is not verified by the checker is equally probable to the event that the
faulty instruction is one of the randomly skipped instructions. Therefore, the










Proof Now let us assume that the filter checker marks correct instructions with a
probability pmc and faulty instructions with a probability pmf . Each instruc-
tion marked by the filter checker can be skipped and can directly proceed to
the commit stage, which gives us the utilization factor of (1−pmc)ρ. Assuming
that this is still too high to protect the performance degradation, correlated
marking can skip additional instructions un-marked by the filter checker with
a probability ps so that correlated marking can let the utilization factor be
less than 1. Then, the new utilization factor becomes (1 − ps)(1 − pmc)ρ.
Since this should be less than 1, correlated marking should have ps satis-
fying ps > 1 −
1
(1−pmc)ρ
. Because the filter checker can mis-speculate the
faulty instructions to be correct with a probability pmf , the success probabil-
ity that the faulty instructions are verified by the checker is upper-bounded




Theorem 3.1 Correlated marking has better fault coverage than random marking
with the same performance, if pmc > pmf .
Proof From Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, the upper bound of correlated marking is
superior to the upper bound of random marking because pmc is much greater
than pmf for the implemented filter checker. Thus, we have the theorem. 2
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Figure 3.3: Hardware Platform.
3.4 Simulation Methodology
3.4.1 Hardware and Software Platform
Our experiments are performed on a detailed event-driven CMP processor sim-
ulator that models the processor pipeline as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The simulator
is derived from the M5 Simulator System, an extension of the out-of-order processor
model in SimpleScalar [13], and has been used previously to study several tech-
niques. For our evaluation, we model a heterogeneous CMP processor with 4-way
issue out-of-order superscalar processor and one simple in-order checker processor.
The processor and memory system settings for the baseline complex regular pro-
cessor are listed in Table 3.1. The baseline checker processor has a 4-issue 2-stage
checker pipeline, which is an in-order single CPI machine with its own register file,
functional units, and L1 cache of the same type as the regular processor.
Our study is driven by SPEC CPU2000 benchmarks. Table 3.2 lists our bench-
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Parameter Value
Fetch Queue Size 32 instructions
Fetch/Decode/Commit Width 4 instructions
Branch Predictor 4K entry BTB and hybrid predictor
Return Address Stack Size 16 entries
Branch Misprediction Recovery Latency 4 cycles
Physical Register File 128 INT, 128 FP
Issue Width 4 INT, 4 FP
Issue Queue Size 32 INT, 32 FP
Load-Store Queue / Reorder Buffer 64 / 256 entries
INT Functional Units 6 ALU, 2 MUL/DIV
FP Functional Units 4 ALU, 2 MUL/DIV
L1 I-Cache 64K 2-way set-associative, 64B line
L1 D-Cache 64K 2-way set-associative, 64B line, 3 cycles
L2 Cache (Shared) 2M 32K set-associative, 64B line, 10 cycles
Memory Latency 100 cycles
Table 3.1: Baseline Core Processor Hardware Parameters.
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marks. We use the pre-compiled alpha binaries, which were built with the highest
level of compiler optimization. All of our benchmarks use the reference input set
provided by SPEC. We selected simulation regions of our workloads in the following
way [21]. First, we used SimPoint [59, 60] to analyze the first 16 billion instructions
(or the entire execution, whichever is shorter) of each benchmark, and picked the
earliest representative region reported by SimPoint. In our simulations, we fast-
forward each benchmark to its representative region. Table 3.2 reports the number
of skipped instructions in each benchmark during the fast forwarding. Finally, we
turn on detailed simulation, and simulate for 10M on-line instructions executed. Due
to the cost of simulation, we are unable to simulate more instructions. However, the
regions we simulate are representative thanks to the SimPoint analysis.
3.4.2 Evaluation
After computing each individual structure’s AVFs, they are combined to pro-
duce the overall AVF of the entire processor. Assuming the reasonable assumption
that logic density is similar among pipeline structures, the probability of a soft error
is directly proportional to the area of the structure. Then, the overall AVF is the
weighted sum of each individual structure’s AVF weighted by the fraction of the
structure’s area. We use a floor plan of the Alpha 21364 processor [62], illustrated
in Figure 3.4, and take area estimates from the floor plan for the structures shown
in Figure 3.5 and compute the overall processor AVF.
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Table 3.2: SPEC CPU2000 Benchmarks.
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(a)
(b)   
(c)
Figure 3.4: Alpha 21364 Floor Plan [62]: (a) Die photograph, (b) Core photograph,





Figure 3.5: Area Model.
48
Chapter 4
Result Usage Based Filter Checker
This chapter discusses how to implement the proposed AVM technique to a
dynamic verification architecture. Instructions that are non-critical from a correct-
ness point of view are identified by a filter checker, described in Section 4.1. Several
kinds of congestion avoidance policies are proposed in Section 4.2. The implemented
filter checker is evaluated using the methodology described in Section 3.4. Finally,
Section 4.3 shows that the proposed AVM has the potential to solve the verification
congestion problem.
4.1 Identifying Correctness-Noncritical (CNC) Instructions
The filter checker is implemented to dynamically correlate the correctness-
noncriticality of instructions with the congestion avoidance policy described in Sec-
tion 4.2. The filter checker serves as a first-level checker that filters the verification
activity before proceeding to the second-level checker processor. Therefore, the fault
coverage loss of AVM is dependent on the speculation for CNC instructions by the
filter checker.
We use a CNI (Correctness-Noncriticality Indicator) bit for each instruction
to let the second-level checker know about the correctness-noncriticality of that
instruction. Since the CNI bit is used only by the checker processor, it is sufficient
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Figure 4.1: Filter Checker Implementation.
that the filter checker can guess and mark CNC instructions during their stay in the
reorder buffer of the main processor, just before retiring instructions to the checker
processor.
The correctness-noncriticality of an instruction is defined by the fraction of
correctness-noncritical bits in the instruction. Correctness-Critical (CC) bits are
those that are required for architecturally correct execution, and Correctness-Non-
Critical (CNC) bits are those that do not affect correct execution. Our correctness
metric uses the Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) metric discussed in Chap-
ter 2. While AVF is used to statically compute the vulnerability factor of a hardware
structure, our correctness metric is applied to the dynamic instruction stream for
characterizing CNC instructions.
For example, consider NOP instructions. Clearly, the only CC bits in a NOP
instruction are the opcode bits that distinguish it from a non-NOP. The remain-
ing bits are CNC. Another example of CNC instructions are the dynamically dead
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Figure 4.2: Breakdown of Correctness-Non-Critical and Correctness-Critical In-
structions.
struction predictor to detect them [15], we use a simple heuristic within the reorder
buffer: identify instructions whose results are not read by any other instructions in
the reorder buffer and mark their CNI bits to notify the correctness-noncriticality
to the second-level checker.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the implemented filter checker. Fortunately, this informa-
tion is readily available in the reorder buffer because calculating the Degree of Usage
(DoU) is straight-forward using the in-order instruction stream at retirement [14].
For each physical register, the filter checker maintains a counter that is incremented
when a use of the corresponding register is observed. When a register is overwritten,
its counter indicates the degree of usage for the value previously in the register. The
counter is then reset and the process resumes. Thus, the degree of usage can be
easily exploited to speculate if an instruction is dynamically dead or not.
Our experiment identifying CNC instructions shows 8.8% NOPs for the SPEC2000
benchmarks in Figure 4.2. The filter checker can find up to 12.5% dynamically dead
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instructions in our evaluation of the SPEC2000 benchmarks. Therefore, signifi-
cant performance improvement is possible without losing the fault coverage, if both
NOPs and potentially dead instructions occupying 21.3% of the dynamic instruction
stream can be marked.
4.2 Congestion Avoidance Policies Simulated
In this section, we categorize congestion avoidance mechanisms and propose
both reactive and proactive congestion avoidance policies. When the checker pro-
cessor becomes a performance bottleneck, AVM can mark some instructions to skip
their verification process so as to reduce the congestion at the checker.
• No AVM (No Marking): In this policy, no marking is done; the core is just
stalled until the congestion is resolved. This is exactly the same architecture
as the original DIVA proposal. However, when not using a checker processor
with wider bandwidth, this policy showed a severe performance degradation
in Section 4.3.1.
• AVM-FC (Reactive Flow Control Based on Measurement): In this
policy, once a congestion is detected, the verification process is skipped for
instructions in a forceful manner. Congestion-phase is tracked by using a
performance counter. Based on the measurement of the overall performance,
AVM decides whether the congestion happens or not. Once the congestion is
over, the system returns to the normal verification mode.
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• AVM-RM (Proactive Random Marking): To avoid congestion before it
occurs, this policy does not need to measure the performance and randomly
drops the core’s verification service needs. That is why we call it a proac-
tive congestion avoidance scheme. Because a congestion avoidance decision is
not correlated with any correctness metric of instructions, the fault coverage
decreases.
• AVM-CM (Proactive Correlated Marking): This policy uses informa-
tion on the correctness non-criticality of instructions. The hint is a simple one-
bit flag that indicates how likely an instruction is to be correctness-non-critical.
The filter checker dynamically identifies Correctness-Non-Critical (CNC) in-
structions and marks them. Using AVM with this policy, if an instruction
is marked as CNC, its verification may be skipped without any loss of fault
coverage. Therefore, the loss of fault coverage can be less than the AVM-RM
policy discussed earlier.
All of the above AVM congestion avoidance policies trade-off fault coverage for
performance in systems or soft computing applications with user-level qualitative
interpretation such as multimedia processing where perfect fault coverage is not
needed. They can achieve better performance at reasonable design points which
provide partial fault coverage. Therefore, with the support of AVM in reliable
processors, the fault tolerance design space is enhanced beyond two extreme points,
namely perfectly fault-tolerant designs and completely non-fault-tolerant designs.
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4.3 Experimental Results
Using the experimental methodology described in Section 3.4, we evaluate the
effect of our proposed AVM techniques on the processor performance and the soft
error rate.
4.3.1 Sensitivity to Checker’s Congestion
Figure 4.3 shows the effect of reduced checker pipeline width. Figure 4.3 (a)
shows the normalized Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) relative to 4-way superscalar
architecture when the checker’s verification widths are 8, 4, 2, and 1. Compared
with a 4-way superscalar architecture, the dynamic verification architecture has no
performance loss with an 8-issue checker pipeline, but around 10% loss with a 4-
issue checker pipeline. As the checker’s verification width decreases, the performance
degrades severely.
The checker processor pipeline delays the retirement of instructions, forcing
the main processor to hold speculative state longer, thus creating back-pressure at
retirement. Figure 4.3 (b) shows this back-pressure effect, comparing the fraction
of time the reorder buffer (ROB) was full. With decreased verification width, the
ROB is full most of the time. If the core’s ROB resources fill, the decoder will also
stall, as it will not be able to allocate ROB and load/store queue resources. As the
congestion continues, the instruction fetch queue gets full in turn. Therefore, these
results indicate that the performance of a dynamic verification processor is highly
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Reduced Verification Width in a Dynamic Verification Archi-
tecture: (a) Performance relative to a configuration with no checker processor, (b)
Fraction of time the main processor’s reorder buffer is full.
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4.3.2 Increasing Performance with AVM
One advantage of using AVM is that it increases the performance of fault-
tolerant processors. We explore how much the proposed AVM is effective in pre-
venting the checker from becoming a performance bottleneck. Figure 4.4 (a) de-
scribes the normalized IPC of several dynamic verification processors (with differ-
ent marking probability) relative to a non-fault-tolerant processor. It shows how
well the proposed AVM manages the verification congestion problem. With no
AVM, congestion in the checker badly affects the performance, amounting to 57%
of a non-fault-tolerant processor. With increasing marking probability of AVM, the
performance of a reliable processor approaches 95% of that of a non-fault-tolerant
processor. AVM with 50% marking can increase the performance by 170% compared
to a dynamic verification processor without AVM. There are no performance dif-
ferences between AVM-RM and AVM-CM because the processor performance only
depends on the marking probability used in AVM.
Another advantage is that AVM provides a reasonable design point to com-
puter architects. With the support of AVM in fault-tolerant processors, the fault tol-
erance design space is enhanced beyond two extreme cases—perfectly fault-tolerant
and non-fault-tolerant designs. AVM with 100% marking is effectively a non-fault-
tolerant superscalar processor. AVM with no marking, on the other extreme, corre-
sponds to full verification. Between these two, a broad range of partial redundancy
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Figure 4.4: Impact of AVM on Performance and Soft Error Rate: (a) Performance,
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Figure 4.5: Trade-off Between Performance and Reliability.
4.3.3 Better Fault Coverage with AVM-CM
One disadvantage of AVM-RM is that it reduces the fault coverage of a pro-
cessor and increases the soft error rate. Figure 4.4 (b) shows the normalized AVF of
dynamic verification architectures with different marking probabilities and conges-
tion avoidance policies relative to a non-fault-tolerant processor. It shows that the
proposed AVM provides better fault tolerance than a non-fault-tolerant processor,
but worse than a fully redundant processor. Randomly marking instructions to be
skipped naturally decreases the fault coverage. Our proposed AVM-CM congestion
avoidance policy (which uses a filter checker), on the other hand, produces only a
small decrease in the fault coverage. Figure 4.4 (b) shows that the proposed AVM-
CM can reduce the soft error rate by 39% and 67% of AVM-RM for 20% and 50%
marking, respectively. Especially, in the case of gcc, AVM-CM shows no decrease
in fault coverage at all and provides the same level of reliability as a fully redundant
processor.
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4.3.4 Trade-off Between Performance and Reliability
To validate the utility of the proposed AVM, we need to capture both perfor-
mance and reliability. For example, a non-fault-tolerant processor has the greatest
IPC as well as the greatest AVF, while a perfectly-fault-tolerant processor has the
least IPC as well as the least AVF. We can use the MITF metric, discussed in Chap-
ter 2, to reason about the trade-off between performance and reliability. At a fixed
frequency and raw error rate of a processor, MITF is proportional to the ratio of
IPC to AVF.
A higher MITF means a larger amount of work done by the processor between
errors. However, in the case that AVF is equal to zero, MITF goes to infinity and
does not capture the performance improvement. Assuming that increasing MITF is
desirable within certain bounds, MITF can be used to evaluate the trade-off. Fig-
ure 4.5 describes the normalized MITF of the proposed AVM schemes relative to
a non-fault-tolerant processor. AVM with correlated 20% marking provides better
MITF than the other AVM schemes. The observation that CNC instructions occu-
pied 21.3% of the dynamic instruction stream answers why AVM-CM around 20%
marking shows the greatest MITF.
4.3.5 Towards a Zero Performance Penalty Design
By monitoring the committed IPC, AVM can be gated off according to the
processor’s congestion status. Exploiting the fact that most of the modern processors
have a performance counter to monitor the committed IPC, this measurement can
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1.    #define EPOCH_SIZE : epoch size
2. #define eval_perf(n) : evaluate the performance during the nth epoch
3. For every Tick {
4. init();
5. For every EPOCH_SIZE cycles {











Figure 4.6: AVM Flow Control Algorithm Pseudo Code.
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be fed back to decide if congestion happens or not. For example, if the checker can
handle its verification workload, then congestion avoidance mechanisms need not to
be applied and AVM can provide perfect fault coverage for the processor. With the
feed-backed committed IPCs, our flow control algorithm applies AVM only during
the congestion phases of the workload. Figure 4.6 illustrates the pueudo code of
the AVM flow control algorithm. Like program phase analysis techniques, our flow
control algorithm breaks program execution into a linear sequence of epochs or fixed-
size time intervals. For each epoch, the algorithm specifies its congestion status to
facilitate the proposed AVM.
The epoch size, measured in processor cycles, is an important parameter for
any phase-based technique. As Figure 4.7 (a) shows, the performance is dependent
on the epoch size. Based on these experiments, we found that a 10-cycle epoch size
yields the same performance as that of a non-fault-tolerant processor. Figure 4.7
(b) presents how the proposed AVM flow control algorithm is effective in that the
performance of reliable processors is maintained at the same level as that of non-
fault-tolerant processors.
4.4 Summary
The performance of a dynamic verification architecture is very sensitive to
the congestion in the checker processor. If the checker processor has limited band-
width, it cannot always keep up with the main processor. We proposed Active
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Figure 4.7: Performance of AVM Flow Control Algorithm: (a) Sensitivity of Perfor-
mance to Epoch Size, (b) Epoch-based Flow Control Algorithm.
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mentation to minimize the congestion in the checker, without significantly affecting
the fault coverage. We showed promising experimental results when AVM is ap-
plied to a dynamic verification architecture. Our proposed AVM is quite effective in
preventing the checker from becoming a performance bottleneck, and our correlated
marking policy works well in reducing the fault coverage loss.
There is still room for identifying more CNC instructions, including logically
masked instructions and operations with narrow-width operands. Once we identify
more CNC instructions, the proposed AVM can achieve more performance gain with
less reliability loss for better MITF. The proposed AVM can also be exploited to
reduce hardware cost and power consumption by halving pipeline width or clock
frequency of the checker processor while maintaining the overall performance. To
show the effectiveness of AVM in low-power processor design, we plan further study
on the impact of AVM on power consumption. With the support of AVM, system
designers can choose a reasonable design point concerning the three design metrics
of performance, power, and reliability.
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Chapter 5
Result Bitwidth Based Filter Checker
5.1 Overview
The previous chapter addressed a performance slowdown problem and pre-
sented a binary correctness criticality based filter checker. In this chapter1, we
propose a more effective pro-active verification management approach to mitigate
the verification workload for high performance fault-tolerant microprocessors. Be-
fore the re-execution process starts at either the redundant thread or the checker
processor, the filter checker quantifies a correctness criticality metric, estimating
how likely an instruction is correctness-critical and prioritizes the verification candi-
dates. Based on that likelihood, critical instructions may proceed to the second-level
checker for further verification, while non-critical instructions may be directly for-
warded to the commit stage without further verification.
Computing the likelihood of correctness criticality is accomplished by exploit-
ing information redundancy of compressing computationally useful data bits. Given
a 64-bit binary representation, computing ‘1 + 2’ has the same architectural vulner-
ability to soft errors as executing ‘334487364720 + 7458523762573’, even though the
former operation seems to be much simpler. With the support of a value compression
technique that explicitly specifies the computationally meaningful bits, the simpler
1A condensed version of this chapter is available in [81].
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operation could be encoded with a smaller number of bits, effectively reducing its
vulnerability to soft errors. In other words, if the information about the number of
computationally significant bits in representing the value could be available, the for-
mer operation would become less vulnerable to soft errors than the latter. Numerical
significance hints let the filter checker prioritize the verification candidates, result-
ing in less fault coverage loss than skipping them blindly. Figure 5.1 illustrates this
idea. Without value compression, all data bytes in Figure 5.1 (a) are numerically
significant ones. Figure 5.1 (b) and (c) present two value compression techniques for
identifying or replicating numerically significant bits, respectively. Once the value
compression is done, the unshaded bytes become numerically insignificant because
they are not required for executing a correct computation, while only the shaded
bytes are necessary and important. Because the unshaded bytes are computation-
ally meaningless, by compressing numerically significant bytes, soft errors caused by
any particle strikes to the unshaded bytes cannot affect the correct operation.
This chapter presents one application of compressing numerically significant
bits and of the correctness criticality based filter checker design. This chapter is
organized as follows. Section 5.2 investigates whether the number of computa-
tionally meaningful bytes is high and presents two value significance compression
techniques, which are Value Identification (VI) and Value Replication (VR). Ex-
ploiting correctness-criticality metrics for fault tolerance is proposed in Section 5.4.
The section defines the Likelihood of Correctness Criticality (LoCC) metric, and
presents an LoCC-based filter checker. The proposed LoCC-based filter checker is








Figure 5.1: Value Compression for Fault Tolerance: (a) No value compression, (b)
Value compression for identifying numerically significant bits, (c) Value compression
for replicating numerically significant bits.
that the proposed LoCC-based filter checker further improves both performance
and reliability, compared to the Binary Correctness Criticality (BCC) based filter
checker.
5.2 Significance Compression for Fault Tolerance
Narrow value compression is a special case of compressing numerically signif-
icant bits. More precisely, narrow values have a simple high order form—either all
zeros or all ones. The information about all zeros or all ones can be encoded with a
few bits by a simple compression technique. The distribution of narrow values has
been found to be very non-uniform. The observation that a large percentage of the






















































Figure 5.2: Percentage of Computationally Meaningful Bytes.
by several value compression techniques, such as low power pipeline design [17] and
cache energy reduction [1, 28, 73]. While previous studies employ value significance
compression for low power design, this chapter exploits it for fault tolerance.
To investigate whether the number of computationally meaningful bytes is
high, we first measure the distribution of numerically significant bits in the SPEC2000
benchmark suite. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of computationally meaningful
bytes in each program. The data in the figure demonstrate that a wide range of ap-
plication programs have a large number of narrow values and that the distribution of
numerically significant bits is strongly biased. The ‘1B’ label in the legend indicates
the percentage of operands that can be represented by one byte. Similarly, ‘2B’ de-
notes the percentage of operands represented by two bytes. We can see that roughly
60% of all operands are less than 8 bits wide and 36% have just one computationlly
meaningful bit! This means that many of the upper order bits in the operand values
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are computationally meaningless. Hence, a significance compression technique can
reduce the vulnerability to soft errors by storing the information about computa-
tionally meaningful bit widths in the conventional value-holding structures such as
register file and data cache.
5.3 Exploiting Narrow Values for AVM
We propose a simple mechanism that effectively reduces the vulnerability to
soft errors in a processor. It is motivated by the fact that many of the produced
and consumed values in a processor are narrow and their upper order bits are mean-
ingless. Therefore, soft errors caused by any particle strike to those higher order
bits can be avoided by simply compressing these narrow values. Exploiting these
narrow values for increasing both performance and reliability in the AVM model is
presented in this chapter. Figure 5.3 shows the proposed AVM architecture with
support for value compression capability.
In order to make use of the observed value significance distribution, we pro-
pose a significance compression technique for narrow values. To effectively capture
instances in which leading zeros or ones are not in multiple of 8 bits, we use a bit
granularity instead of a byte granularity. Given a 64-bit architecture, a leading zeros
or ones counter logic counts the leading bits and encodes its counting value through
a 64-to-6 line priority encoder with inputs exclusive-OR-ed for adjacent bits of the
value to determine a bit position where the value changes from 0 to 1 or 1 from 0.
The number of leading zeros or ones can be obtained by negating the output of the
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Figure 5.3: AVM Architecture with Value Compression.
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Figure 5.4: Significance Compression Encoder: (a) Value Identification (VI), (b)
Value Replication (VR).
encoder. Instead of using additional bits to keep this number, we propose a scheme
that reuses the Most Significant Byte (MSB), which can be freed up if the counter
value is less than 56.
Figure 5.4 illustrates two encoding techniques for narrow values. Figure 5.4 (a)
shows a Value Identification (VI) encoding scheme in which a narrow value is defined
by a value of width less than 56 bits. The upper two bits of the MSB are narrow value
indicator bits to indicate whether the value is encoded or not and which encoding
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methods are used for significance compression. The other six bits in the MSB
represent the number of leading zeros or ones counted in the previous counter logic.
Even though the Value Identification encoding scheme reduces the architectural
vulnerability of value-holding structures, it introduces an one-byte overhead. Soft
errors can still happen in the unprotected parts of the compressed value. Therefore,
we present another Value Replication (VR) encoding scheme to provide redundancy
for it by replicating the value (depicted in Figure 5.4 (b)). In this case, a narrow
value is defined by a value of width less than 24 bits with the Value Replication
encoding scheme.
5.4 Computing Value-based Correctness Criticality
This section presents a simple mechanism that effectively reduces the vulner-
ability to soft errors in a microprocessor, which is motivated by the fact that many
of the produced and consumed values in the processors are narrow and their up-
per order bits are meaningless. Our approach exploits a Value-based Correctness
Criticality (VCC) property and manages unnecessary redundancy pro-actively.
With the Binary Correctness Criticality (BCC) metric used in Chapter 4, the
number of correctness-non-critical instructions is not very high and only about 20%
of the dynamic instructions could be marked. Instead, this chapter uses a Likelihood
of Correctness Criticality (LoCC) metric, which indicates how likely an instruction
is to be correctness-critical. The filter checker prioritizes the verification candidates










































































Figure 5.5: Likelihood of Correctness Criticality: (a) Percentage of LCNC instruc-
tions, (b) Density function of LoCC values.
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The Likelihood of Correctness Criticality (LoCC) is quantified by computing
a Value Vulnerability Factor (VVF), which is defined by the numerically significant
bit-width used to compute a result. The VVF metric of a value is defined by the
probability that a bit flip caused by a particle strike on any bit in the value will
result in an erroneous behavior in the executed computation. Therefore, it can be
estimated as a ratio of the number of leading zeros or ones to the total number of
bits. The LoCC metric for an instruction is given by a scaled sum of the VVFs of all
the source operands of that instruction. With the support of the value compression
technique introduced in Section 5.2, the information about the computationally
significant bits is already propagated along the data path to compute an execution
result. Therefore, we can compute the LoCC metric for each dynamic instruction.
The filter checker can utilize this value to speculate how likely the instruction is
correctness-critical. Given two instructions Ia and Ib, if LoCC(Ia) > LoCC(Ib),
then instruction Ia is more likely to be correctness-critical than Ib. For simplicity,
an LoCC of 50% is assigned to an instruction if 50% of the value widths averaged
over all source operands of that instruction is computationally meaningful.
5.5 Prioritizing Verification Based on VCC
For the verification priority determined by a filter checker, the computed LoCC
values are compared with a threshold LoCC value, which is set to 5 in this chapter,
to mark the Likely Correctness Non-Critical (LCNC) instructions. In other words, a
type of hypothesis testing with a likelihood function is done to speculate how likely
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an instruction is to be correctness-non-critical. Figure 5.5 (b) shows the distribution
of the LoCC metric over the SPEC2000 benchmark suite. Its density function
shows that the LoCC metric yields a wide distribution of values, which indicates
the potential to distinguish not just 0-1 correctness criticality but various degrees
of correctness criticality. Figure 5.5 (a) shows the percentage of LCNC instructions
determined by a filter checker. Being able to distinguish between CC and LCNC
instructions by exploiting the LoCC values (which are equally CC instructions in
the case of 0-1 correctness criticality), the filter checker can afford to mark more
instructions without sacrificing the fault coverage. To understand the benefit of
being able to distinguish between CC and LCNC instructions based on the LoCC
values, it is useful to view an LoCC value as a measure of expected penalty of
skipping verification when any particle strike happens in the marked instructions.
For example, if a 10% fault coverage loss results when a defective instruction with
an LoCC value of 50% is skipped for verification, a wrong decision on correctness
criticality speculated by a filter checker for an instruction with an LoCC value of
20% would incur a 4% fault coverage loss. By preferring the latter instruction as a
marking candidate, the filter checker can save about 6% fault coverage loss.
5.6 Implementation
In order to further reduce the vulnerability to soft errors along the data path,
we need a functional unit partitioned into two asymmetric parts which can operate
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Figure 5.6: A Functional Unit Partitioned into Two Asymmetric Parts.
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with value compression capabilities, we borrow from the work done by Choi et al [20].
They implemented a functional unit with partially guarded computation. The higher
order bits of the input operands are selectively passed on to the MSP part of the
function unit that operates on them through latches. The latches are controlled
by our leading zeros or ones counter logic, which can detect whether the higher
order bits of both the operands are either zeros or ones. By dynamically bypassing
the MSP part of the P-ALU to avoid numerically meaningless computation, the
vulnerability to soft errors of narrow values can be effectively reduced. Figure 5.6
illustrates how value compression works for the implemented P-ALU.
5.7 Experimental Results
Impacts of our proposed Active Verification Management (AVM) on the pro-
cessor performance and reliability are evaluated in this section. One advantage of
using the proposed scheme is that it reduces the performance degradation due to
checker processors. We explore how much the proposed scheme (for AVM with signif-
icance compression capability) is effective in preventing the checker from becoming
a performance bottleneck.
Figure 5.7 shows the normalized Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) of several dy-
namic verification processors (with different correctness criticality metric) relative
to a non-fault-tolerant processor. For each benchmark, 5 bars are shown, corre-
sponding to the following 5 dynamic verification schemes: DIVA, BCC only, BCC













































Figure 5.7: Normalized IPC (Instructions Per Cycle) for Five Different Dynamic
Verification Schemes.
VI, and LoCC with VR.
Let us analyze the results presented in Figure 5.7. Because DIVA has no mark-
ing scheme, its performance is the worst. With no AVM, the checker’s congestion
badly affects the DIVA processor’s performance, reducing it to 57% of that of a
non-fault-tolerant processor. The AVM scheme based on 0-1 correctness criticality
shows a limited performance improvement over DIVA. The ‘BCC-with-RM-30%’ in
the legend indicates that AVM employs additional random marking of 30% with
0-1 correctness criticality based marking. Through bypassing instructions blindly
from verification process, this scheme shows additional performance gain, but the
fault coverage decreases compared with the former one. The results for both ‘LoCC-
with-VI’ and ‘LoCC-with-VR’ schemes demonstrate that the proposed AVM with
value compression capability effectively manages the verification congestion prob-
lem. VCC-based AVM always maintained the same performance as that of a system


























































































































Figure 5.8: Soft Error Rate for Different Dynamic Verification Schemes: (a) Value
Vulnerability Factor, (b) Architectural Vulnerability Factor.
According to the definition of the VVF metric, it indicates how much a value
is vulnerable to soft errors. After summing each VVF for a value, the average VVF
is computed by dividing it by the total number of values. With 0-1 correctness
criticality, its VVF is defined by unity because it has no significance compression
capability. Figure 5.8 (a) compares the normalized VVF of two significance com-
pression encoding methods relative to 0-1 correctness criticality. Value Replication
(VR) shows less VVF than Value Identification (VI). This comes from the fact that
the VI scheme introduces an one-byte overhead, which is unprotected from soft
errors, while the VR scheme is hardened by replicating the compressed value.
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Figure 5.8 (b) shows the normalized processor AVF of AVM architectures with
different correctness criticality metrics relative to a non-fault-tolerant processor. It
indicates that AVM provides better fault tolerance than a non-fault-tolerant pro-
cessor. As expected, ‘BCC-with-RM-30%’ shows severe decrease in fault coverage,
compared with the other three AVM schemes, through bypassing instructions blindly
from the verification process. It also shows that the proposed AVM scheme based
on VCC has little impact on the soft error rate and provides the same level of re-
liability as the AVM based on 0-1 correctness criticality. Figure 5.8 (b) shows that
the proposed VCC-based AVM can reduce the soft error rate by 18% of that of a
non-fault-tolerant processor.
To validate the utility of the proposed VCC-based AVM, we need to capture
both performance and reliability. We again use the metric Mean Instructions To
Failure (MITF) to reason about the trade-off between performance and reliability.
At a fixed frequency and raw error rate of a processor, MITF is proportional to the
ratio of IPC to AVF. A higher MITF means a larger amount of work done by the
processor between errors. However, in the case that AVF is equal to zero, MITF
goes to infinity and does not capture the performance improvement. Assuming that
increasing MITF is desirable within certain bounds, MITF can be used to evaluate
the trade-off. Figure 5.9 shows the normalized MITF of several AVM schemes
relative to a non-fault-tolerant processor. VCC-based AVM provides better MITF
than other AVM schemes based on 0-1 correctness criticality. It shows that the
proposed VCC-based AVM can improve both performance and reliability 5.8 times










































This chapter presents a correctness criticality based filter checker, a pro-active
verification management technique to mitigate the verification workload of fully-
fault-tolerant processors. This is accomplished by exploiting information redun-
dancy of compressing numerically insignificant bits. Exploiting value-based correct-
ness criticality for the filter checker keeps its performance the same as that of high
performance non-fault-tolerant processor, while significantly increasing reliability.
Experimental results show that the proposed scheme accelerates a traditional fully-
fault-tolerant processor by 1.7 times, while it reduces the soft error rate to 18% of
that of a non-fault-tolerant processor.
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Chapter 6
Result Anomaly Based Filter Checker
6.1 Overview
In the previous chapters, to mitigate the verification workload for fault-tolerant
processors, we proposed Active Verification Management (AVM) techniques which
employed filter checkers based on correctness-criticality metrics. In this chapter1,
an anomaly-speculation-based filter checker is proposed as a pro-active verification
management technique. Anomaly speculation is accomplished by exploiting a value
similarity property micro-architecturally, characterized by a frequent occurrence of
partially identical values with the same subsets of consecutive bits.
It has been observed that the distribution of used values is very non-uniform.
The observation that a few values account for the majority of values used implies
that the distribution of data values is strongly biased, which means that instead of
assigning verification resources uniformly to every instruction, value locality can be
exploited to prioritize verification candidates for an efficient fault tolerance mecha-
nism. The bias in data values is taken advantage of by several micro-architectural
techniques, such as value prediction [36], instruction reuse [66], cache hierarchy [32],
and efficient register file organization [31, 33], etc. This research especially explores
the repeated occurrence of multiple live value instances identical in a subset of their
1A condensed version of this chapter appears in [78].
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bits, described as a partial value locality [31]. After investigating the partial value
locality of instruction streams, we found that the Hamming distance of two con-
secutive computation results is usually small, indicating that only a few bits in the
result value vary among different execution instances. This implies that partial value
locality exists in destination operands and its scope is strongly biased.
Based on the biased distribution of Hamming distance, this research investi-
gates further how to exploit the observed partial value locality for soft error tol-
erance. Because a soft error may incur a transient one-bit flip which cannot be
easily detected by monitoring its Hamming distance, this chapter re-defines a micro-
architectural similarity distance metric to detect an abnormal deviation away from
a nominal similarity distance of computation results, as a special type of partial
value locality. This work shows how the value similarity property can be used in the
design of a filter checker to lower the pressure on the processor resources, improving
its performance with a minimal effect on overall reliability.
Detection of an anomaly in instruction streams is achieved by a speculative
value similarity distance cache, followed by an anomaly tester, to mark a re-execution
candidate for further verification. The similarity distance cache dynamically cap-
tures a run-time behavior of similarity between result values and keeps learning the
nominal scope of variance with a confidence score. When an instantaneous vari-
ance produced by instruction instances exceeds the nominal similarity distance, a
likely-to-be soft error can be marked by the anomaly tester. Figure 6.1 (a) describes
a block diagram of the proposed anomaly-speculation-based filter checker. With a
value distance predictor and an anomaly tester, the proposed scheme speculates an
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Figure 6.1: Anomaly Speculation Based AVM architecture.
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anomaly and provides soft error tolerance based on the anomaly test. This chapter
proves the existence and the frequency of occurrence of similar values and presents
how the characterized value similarity can be exploited in the design of anomaly-
speculation-based filter checker.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 investigates a partial value lo-
cality and characterizes distributions of both Hamming distance and micro-architectural
similarity distance. Section 6.3 describes an anomaly-speculation-based active verifi-
cation management and implements an anomaly filter checker. Section 6.5 evaluates
the impact of the proposed mechanism on performance and reliability. Finally, fu-
ture work and conclusion are discussed in Section 6.6.
6.2 Characterizing Value Similarity Property
Distance metrics can be used to determine similarity or dissimilarity between
two data values. One of well-known similarity distance measures is Hamming dis-
tance [23], which is the minimum number of bits that should be modified to convert
one value into another. The variance between two data values can be computed by
using exclusive-OR on corresponding bits. Its Hamming distance is obtained by the
number of 1’s in the exclusive-OR bit string. In fact, this is a dissimilarity measure
since bigger value shows disagreement in two data values.
Figure 6.2 (a) and (b) shows the distribution of Hamming distance between
two consecutive computation result values in the SPEC2000 benchmark suite. The















































Figure 6.2: Hamming Distance: (a) Distribution function of Hamming distance, (b)
Distribution of n-dissimilar values.
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confirming a small range of values account for the majority of values computed. Since
Hamming distance is a measure of how much two values disagree each other, the dis-
tribution function proves how likely two consecutive results are similar. For instance,
it shows that a single value accounts for 36% of all results across SPEC2000 pro-
grams. Furthermore, 82% of all values vary only within the scope of 16-bits width,
showing that partially identical values occur frequently in a dynamic instruction
stream.
Without partial value locality, the distribution would have been uniform. This
chapter extends its application to soft error tolerance. Although Hamming distance
is a good indicator of how likely values are similar, the metric is not suitable to
detect a soft error of one-bit flip in the original data. For example, let’s consider a
64-bit binary value 0x0000000000000001 and a bit flip occurs at the most significant
bit position. The value then becomes 0x8000000000000001 and then its Hamming
distance with previous value 0x0000000000000003 changes from 1 to 2, which is hard
to distinguish whether the value is defected. This chapter proposes a new similarity
distance measure to easily detect an abnormal deviation from the result values.
More specifically, two 64-bit values are called micro-architecturally n-dissimilar if
they only differ in n least significant bits and are equal in the remaining (64 − n)
high-order bits. Micro-architectural similarity distance does not only reflect the fact
that two computation results are near one another in the Hamming distance but
also captures a deviation scope from one another. Therefore, the proposed similarity
distance is a special type of partial value locality.












































Figure 6.3: Distribution of Value Similarity Distance.
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Figure 6.3 (b) illustrates the distribution of micro-architecturally n-dissimilar val-
ues, indicating that the amount of similar values are still high. More precisely,
8-dissimilar values account for 52% of all result values across the SPEC2000 pro-
grams, including 36% of exactly the same values. Different sections of the bar graph
show the fraction of 8-dissimilar, 16-dissimilar, 24-dissimilar, 32-dissimilar and the
rest of them, respectively. The cumulative distribution function in Figure 6.3 (a)
shows a similar distribution to the narrow value’s, presented in the previous liter-
ature [12], indicating that there exists a 16% jump from 33 to 34 distance, besides
36% jump from 0 to 1. This is because the memory address in the Alpha ISA uses
33 bits and reflects the fact that memory address operations followed by usual data
operations incur a large deviation from the previous result. To simplify the notation,
micro-architecturally n-dissimilar values will be just called similar in the remainder
of this chapter.
6.3 Exploiting Similar Values for Anomaly Speculation
Section 6.2 showed the facts that many values are micro-architecturally similar,
a group of similar values shares the high-order bits and each value instance in the
group is uniquely represented by its remaining least significant bits. Therefore, if
the information on the similarity distance would be available before the re-execution
process starts, only least-significant bits within the similarity distance could be
considered to be computationally useful, while the remaining high-order bits would
not be susceptible to soft errors. The characterized value similarity property can be
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Figure 6.4: Anomaly Test with Speculative Similarity Distance Cache.
exploited to speculate an abnormal behavior due to soft errors during the program
execution [79].
Traditional value prediction has a difficulty to predict data values when in-
structions do not produce strong value patterns like constants or strides. However,
although the computed results do not exhibit a predictable value patterns, their sim-
ilarity distance is likely to be small and stable over time according to our measure-
ment. For example, given instances with result values of 0, 30, 3, 1, 55, in sequence,
if the next instance produces an extremely large result such as 100000000000055,
it would indicate an abnormal behavior due to a sudden increase of its similarity
distance. Therefore, such an abrupt deviation would hint a high possibility of a soft
error. Similarity distance also captures a spatial locality, which refers to the fact
that memory operations tend to access data in a fixed memory region and generate
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a certain address sequence within the same heap space. Therefore, an out-of-range
address would indicate a likely-to-be soft error. Even for instructions with a repeat-
ing stride pattern, the similarity distance is constrained to the maximum value’s
width and any result showing a larger distance would signal a potential soft error.
Table 6.1 shows misprediction rate of the proposed anomaly speculation, which
is measured by the rate of speculating potential errors when there happens no soft
errors. Average misprediction rate is computed by 10.6% across the SPEC2000
programs. Therefore, there seems to be an apparent similarity distance pattern,
whose variance is similar nine times in a row, then dissimilar once on average.
Anomaly speculation is rather similar to branch prediction than value prediction,
in that it predicts whether the similarity distance is normal or abnormal based on
the previous similarity history. In general, for branches used to form loops, where a
branch is taken many times in a row and then not taken once, a simple 1-bit branch
predictor mispredicts at twice the rate that the branch is taken. Similarly, in the
proposed anomaly prediction, it seems that we should expect that the accuracy of
the anomaly predictor would at least match the frequency of similar values.
6.4 Anomaly Speculation for Active Verification Management
Having demonstrated that the similarity distance has a strongly-biased distri-
bution and are easily predictable, we now present one application of value similarity
property to design a pro-active filter checker based on anomaly speculation. The
basic concepts of Active Verification Management (AVM) and anomaly speculation
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Benchmark Misprediction Rate Benchmark Misprediction Rate
ammp 6.78% gzip 15.78%
bzip2 10.49% lucas 3.87%
crafty 15.84% mesa 8.59%
equake 8.18% parser 9.10%
fma3d 9.15% swim 8.99%
gcc 21.72% vortex 8.72%
Table 6.1: Misprediction rate of anomaly speculation.
are described in this section. The goal of AVM is to reduce the verification workload
and to achieve better fault coverage than non-fault-tolerant processor’s, without in-
curring performance degradation even when resource contention happens. The basic
idea is similar to that of a cache hierarchy. Because a small cache is fast and a fast
cache is expensive, a cost-effective hierarchical solution can be achieved to obtain
both fast speed and large size by exploiting the principle of locality. In the AVM, a
simple filter checker gives a hint for each instruction whether its re-execution should
be done or not. For example, instructions un-marked by the filter checker may be di-
rectly passed to the commit stage by skipping verification, while marked instructions
may proceed to the second-level primary checker for further re-execution.
This chapter presents an anomaly-speculation-based filter checker in the AVM
design paradigm. Whenever an instruction produces a result that deviates a lot
from the previous result, it would hint a potential soft error due to such an abnor-
mal behavior. With the hint given by an anomaly test, only the marked instructions
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proceeds to further verification, otherwise the computed result can be committed to
the physical register file. Given a similarity distance n, any error in the least sig-
nificant n bits cannot be detected by the proposed anomaly speculation, compared
to fully-fault-tolerant architectures. However, the majority of data paths produc-
ing (64 − n) high-order bits of the computed results can be protected, which can
significantly reduce Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) of the processor.
The proposed design for anomaly speculation is illustrated in Figure 6.4. There
are two major structures in the anomaly-speculation-based filter checker, which are
a speculative similarity distance cache and an anomaly tester. The speculative
distance cache dynamically tracks value similarity of instruction streams and keeps
learning its run-time behavior with a saturating counter of confidence score. The
similarity distance cache can be accessed by program counter of each instruction. A
current execution result is exclusive-OR-ed with the previous result to compute an
instantaneous variance. Its similarity distance is obtained by a Leading Zero Counter
(LZC) to count the number of consecutive zeros in the high-order bits. Then, an
anomaly tester compares the current similarity distance with the speculated one
in the similarity distance cache. If the current similarity distance exceeds than the
speculated one, the confidence score should be considered next to check whether it is
still learning a nominal scope of value similarity. If the confidence has the maximum
score, a potential soft error is detected and a check bit flag is set, otherwise the
speculated similarity distance is replaced by the current one and the confidence score
is reset by zero. If the current similarity distance is smaller than the speculated one,
the confidence score is incremented and no soft error is speculated. The previous
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result field is then updated by the current one.
6.5 Experimental Evaluation
For the core processor, a 4-way 64-bit superscalar processor is used. The
primary checker processor has a 4-issue checker pipeline, which is an in-order single
CPI machine with its own register file, functional units, and L1 cache of the same
type as the core processor. The speculative similarity distance cache has 256 entries
and is configured as 2-way set-associative. Each entry is composed of several fields,
which are a 6-bit speculated similarity distance, a 64-bit last result value, a 2-bit
confidence score and a 1-bit check flag.
Figure 6.5 (a) shows dramatic performance slowdown of fully-fault-tolerant
processor due to the resource contention, compared with non-fault-tolerant super-
scalar processor. One advantage of using the proposed anomaly-speculation-based
filter checker is that it removes the performance degradation due to the resource con-
tention from redundant re-execution, increasing performance relative to fully-fault-
tolerant processors. The performance degradation result was already introduced in
Chapter 4. The question is that how well the proposed verification management
works. Figure 6.5 (b) shows the Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) relative to fully-fault-
tolerant DIVA-like architectures. The IPC of proposed anomaly-speculation-based
AVM is 1.8 times larger on average across the SPEC2000 programs, than that of
fully-fault-tolerant processor. Furthermore, the proposed scheme has the same IPC
















































Figure 6.5: Relative IPC.
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structions without abnormal results from further re-execution process, the result
in Figure 6.5 demonstrates that our anomaly-speculation-based scheme works well
to completely remove the performance degradation happened at fully-fault-tolerant
processors.
Another advantage is that the proposed anomaly-speculation-based filter checker
decreases Soft Error Rate (SER) relative to non-fault-tolerant processors. To eval-
uate the impact on reliability of the processor, we used the same methodology of
computing Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF), described in [45] The proces-
sor’s SER is computed by the product of raw error rate and AVF of the hardware
structure. Because raw error rate is generally likely to be proportional to the area
of each hardware component, the processor’s AVF is obtained by a weighted sum
of each component’s AVF. Given a floor plan of the Alpha 21364 processor [62], we
used the area model to compute the weight.
Any soft error in the least significant bits, within the scope of the similarity dis-
tance, cannot be detected by the proposed anomaly-speculation-based filter checker.
Compared to fully-fault-tolerant architectures, this refers to decrease fault coverage
of the proposed scheme. However, majority of data paths producing high-order
bits can be protected from soft errors in its upper bits out of similarity distance.
Figure 6.6 shows the processor AVF relative to non-fault-tolerant processors. The
AVF of anomaly-speculation-based processor is 53% smaller on average across the
SPEC2000 programs, than that of our baseline superscalar processor. Therefore,
the result in Figure 6.6 demonstrates that the potential soft error, indicated by






















Figure 6.6: Relative Architectural Vulnerability Factor.
resulting in improvement of reliability.
6.6 Summary
This chapter presented an anomaly-speculation-based fault tolerance, a pro-
active verification management technique to mitigate the verification workload of
fully-fault-tolerant processors. This was accomplished by exploiting value similarity
property. Experimental characterization proves the existence and scope of similar
values. Results demonstrate that the proposed scheme increases 1.8 times faster
than that of fully-fault-tolerant processor with a minimal impact on overall soft
error rate and reliability of the proposed AVM processor is 53% better than that of
non-fault-tolerant processor. As future work, we plan to investigate how to exploit




Comparative Analysis and Potential Applications
7.1 Comparison of the Proposed Filter Checkers
Impacts of our filter checkers proposed in this dissertation on the processor
performance and reliability are evaluated in this section. One advantage of using
the proposed scheme is that it reduces the performance degradation due to checker
processors.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the normalized Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) of three filter
checkers relative to a non-fault-tolerant processor. For each benchmark, 4 bars are
shown, corresponding to the following 4 dynamic verification schemes: No AVM,
result-usage-based filter checker, result-bitwidth-based filter checker, and result-
anomaly-based filter checker. All three schemes show better performance than a
dynamic verification processor without AVM and the proposed AVM are very effec-
tive in preventing the checker from becoming a performance bottleneck. Further-
more, either result-bitwidth-based or result-anomaly-based filter checker maintains
the same performance as that of non-fault-tolerant processor, and about 1.7 times
the performance of a conventional DIVA processor.
Figure 7.2 shows the normalized processor AVF of three schemes relative to a
non-fault-tolerant processor. It indicates that AVM provides better fault tolerance












































Figure 7.1: Normalized IPC (Instructions Per Cycle) for Three Filter Checkers.
filter checker shows worse fault coverage, compared with the other two filter checkers.
However, those based on the correctness-criticality metrics have almost the same
level of soft error rate, which reduces the soft error rate by 18% of that of a non-
fault-tolerant processor.
Similarly, Figure 7.3 shows the normalized MITF of three filter checkers rel-
ative to a non-fault-tolerant processor. The result-bitwidth-based AVM provides
better MITF than other AVM schemes. It shows that the proposed result-bitwidth-
based AVM can improve both performance and reliability 5.8 times better than that
of a non-fault-tolerant processor.
7.2 Reliability and Complexity Impact of the Filter Checker
Several issues related to the implementation of the filter checker are elaborated
in this section. We address the hardware complexity, the effects of soft errors in the
filter checker itself, and the impact on cycle time. The filter checker needs extra















































Figure 7.2: Soft Error Rate for Three Filter Checkers.
some extra fields such as Degree of Usage (DoU) in the register file and Correctness
Non-criticality Indicator (CNI) flag in the reorder buffer. However, this hardware
overhead is minor compared to a simple duplication scheme. The Active Verification
Management (AVM) is a reasonably good fault tolerant technique to provide high
performance, with only moderate additional hardware in the form of a simple checker
processor and a filter checker.
Like any logic units in the processor, the filter checker is also vulnerable to soft
errors and it can cause the miss-speculation of correctness-noncritical instructions.
However, there is no need for any protection in the filter checker. The reason is that
soft errors that corrupt the filter checker have two possible outcomes—they induce
the filter checker to signal a false CNI information, resulting in either verification
overhead in the second-level checker or a loss of fault coverage.
The filter checker only needs the instruction’s opcode and operands to start a
CNI decision. This information is available as early as the decode stage, while the








































Figure 7.3: Mean-Instruction-To-Failure for Three Filter Checkers.
end of execution stage. Therefore, the filter checker is not on the critical path of
the processor and should not badly impact on the cycle time.
7.3 Other Potential Applications
This section presents potential applications for utilizing the proposed AVM.
For dynamic verification to be viable, the checker processor bandwidth must match
the retirement bandwidth of the core processor. The checker processor can slow the
progress of the core processor in the following design examples.
One example is a reliability-preferred design through a more robust checker [4].
In an effort to build an electrically robust implementation of the checker, it may
be necessary to construct it with large timing margins and large transistors to re-
sist noise and tolerate natural radiation interference. It will increase the checker’s
latency, which can delay the retirement of instructions. These delays may cause
congestion in the instruction window, effectively reducing the instruction window
size and amount of Instruction Level Parallelism that can be exploited.
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Another important example is a power-preferred design through low-power
checker [49] or aggressively low supply voltage [3]. The need for redundancy in re-
liable processors is directly opposed to the growing demand [11, 41] for more power
efficient operation. Conventional techniques [4, 44, 51, 54, 68, 72] that provide fault
detection by supporting whole-thread duplication generally incur significant energy
overhead, which can exacerbate the already severe problem of power consumption
and heat dissipation. Approaches that supply the necessary level of robustness at
a given throughput requirement may also be power-aware. For example, through
the use of Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS), energy overhead can be reduced sig-
nificantly. However, it turns out that the maximum operating frequency of the
checker processor is limited by the scaled supply voltage [41], which causes severe
performance degradation. Furthermore, if it is applied to the power-preferred design
through low-power checker described previously, it is possible to reduce the power
consumption as well as increase the performance with a small loss in fault coverage.
Therefore, the proposed AVM could be utilized by the following application
areas. First, the low power reliable processor design is one promising area to con-
sider. The verification bandwidth can be scaled by gating off unnecessary verifica-
tion pipelines according to the processor’s congestion status. For example, during
a low-IPC phase in the main processor, a narrower verification width is sufficient
to check the computations of the main core. Such a variable verification bandwidth
scaling and adjusting the marking probability with the committed IPC are adaptive
approaches to reduce power consumption in reliable processors.
A simple example for low power design is illustrated in Figure 7.4. Here we
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can slow down the checker processor by using Dynamic Frequency Scaling (DFS)
or Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS) and reduce the power overheads of either RMT
or DIVA-like microprocessors. DFS is a popular power reduction techniques as
dynamic power is directly proportional to operating frequency. Dynamic power P
is given by the following equation:
P = a × C × Vdd
2 × f (7.1)
where a is a switching activity factor, C is a capacitance being charged, V is
a voltage swing, and f is a processor frequency.
In Figure 7.4, (a) shows a 2GHz 150W DIVA processor showing performance
slowdown with IPC = 2 due to the checker’s congestion. After applying DFS
to the original DIVA, in which the checker’s frequency gets reduced to 1.33GHz,
the low-power DIVA, illustrated in (b), achieves less power 133W than (a), but its
performance degrades a lot to IPC = 1 as the checker’s congestion gets worse than
(a). Figure 7.4 (c) illustrates that the proposed AVM is added into the low-power
DIVA after applying DFS. With a good AVM marking, (c) can not only increase
performance but also reduce power. In our example, it can achieve IPC = 3 and
P = 133W with a 1.33GHz checker processor.
Another promising application is to use the AVM for adaptive resource al-
location in simultaneous multi-threading. By exploiting the congestion avoidance
concept introduced in this paper, an efficient resource sharing scheme can be de-
signed. For example, suppose that two threads share equal number of entries in
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Figure 7.4: Reliable Power-efficient Architecture.
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case, our AVM can be applied to distribute the reorder buffer entries more efficiently
between the two threads.
In order to be readily acceptable by processor manufacturers and customers,
fault tolerance schemes must satisfy three criteria—low hardware overhead, low
performance overhead, and good fault coverage. Though perfect fault coverage
would be required in specialized servers and mission-critical flight systems in space
applications, the rest of the market does not need perfect fault coverage. Commercial
desktops and commodity servers can trade off performance and reliability to arrive
at reasonable design points. In such applications, employing the AVM to achieve
both high performance and reasonably good reliability, makes sense. Therefore, the




Computer architects have repeatedly shown that narrow values have a strongly
biased distribution, say a few narrow values account for the majority of values used.
They have observed that a large percentage of the values processed in the pipeline
are narrow and can be encoded with less bits than full data width [1, 17, 28, 73] or
just identified [12, 25, 34]. Several value compression techniques are taken advan-
tage of by several micro-architectural techniques, such as designing very low power
pipelines [17] and cache energy reduction [1, 28, 73]. While previous studies employ
value compression techniques mainly for reducing energy consumption such as reg-
ister file or data cache, this chapter exploits them for improving both performance
and reliability.
A host of concurrent system-level fault tolerance techniques has been pro-
posed exploiting additional redundant execution processors [4, 44, 50, 51, 54, 68, 72].
Such redundant execution techniques employ Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT)
[44, 51, 54, 72] or Chip Multi-Processing (CMP) [4, 68] to provide coarse-grain in-
struction replication with a modest amount of additional hardware support. Be-
cause the main thread shares the limited resources with the redundant thread, the
performance degradation problem caused by redundant execution is common to all
fully-fault-tolerant architectures. Most of previous studies have focused mainly on
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the achievement of reliability with little attention on the performance overhead in-
curred by re-execution. The proposed work considers performance of fault-tolerant
processors to explore the trade-off between performance and reliability.
Running multiple threads in thread-level redundancy solutions places a signif-
icant pressure on the processor resources, resulting in a considerable performance
loss. Recently, efficient resource management techniques [30, 35, 65] between the
main leading thread and the redundant trailing thread have been proposed in an
SMT implementation. Exploring a partial redundancy for soft error detection is
similar to opportunistic transient fault detection [30], in which the redundancy is
opportunistically adjusted according to the amount of Instruction Level Parallelism
(ILP). Our approach exploits a value-based correctness criticality property and man-
ages the redundancy pro-actively based on the biased distribution of Likelihood of
Correctness Criticality (LoCC).
The concept of Binary Correctness Criticality (BCC) borrows from computing
Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) proposed by Mukherjee et al [45]. While
AVF is used to statically compute the vulnerability factor of a hardware structure,
our correctness criticality metric is applied to dynamic instruction stream for charac-
terizing likely correctness critical instructions. Similar likelihood function has been
applied for criticality analysis of program execution latency for clustering in super-
scalar processors [55]. Our LoCC metric is different in that criticality in terms of
correctness viewpoint is dynamically exploited to prioritize verification candidates
using the filter checker.
Computer architects have repeatedly shown that data values have a strongly
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biased distribution, say a few values account for the majority of values used. This
value locality has been exploited by several micro-architectural techniques. Both
value prediction [36] and instruction reuse [66] are such techniques, which takes
advantage of identical values seen repeatedly in the pipeline. Another usage is the
cache hierarchy, which works good because of the principle of address locality. They
exploit either temporal or spatial locality in the same data values.
A partial value locality is defined by the repeated occurrence of partially iden-
tical data values. Some techniques exploit this property for organizing a content-
aware integer register file [31], sharing physical registers [33], or information redun-
dancy [24]. Value similarity is a special case of partial value locality. A similarity
measure is usually used to cluster objects into groups with similar properties. This
work characterizes it with a distance metric to improve performance and reliability
of fault-tolerant processors. Some techniques exploit narrow values to optimize pro-
cessor resources [12, 34]. Narrow values have a simple high-order bits with either all
0’s or all 1’s and do share high-order bits. Therefore, the narrow value is a subset
of similar values and it is treated in a simple way in the set of similar values.
Exploring partial redundancy for soft error detection is similar to opportunistic
transient fault detection [30], in which the redundancy is opportunistically adjusted
according to the amount of Instruction Level Parallelism (ILP). Our approach ex-
ploits a partial value locality property and manages the redundancy pro-actively
based on the biased distribution of similar values. Given the proposed fault de-
tection is based on an anomaly speculation, it is worth to address the differences
between our approach and ReStore [74]. Their symptom-based soft error detection
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considers mispredictions of high confidence branches as symptoms of soft errors. In-
stead of using branch mispredictions as symptoms, we use an abnormal result value





9.1 Summary of Contributions and Implications of the Research
Microprocessors are becoming increasingly susceptible to soft errors due to the
current trends of semiconductor technology scaling. Traditional redundant multi-
threading architectures provide good fault tolerance by re-executing all the compu-
tations. However, such a full re-execution significantly increases the demand on the
processor resources, resulting in severe performance degradation.
In Chapter 3, we showed that dynamic verification using the checker processor
introduces severe degradation in performance unless the checker is as fast as the
main processor core. Without widening the checker’s bandwidth, we proposed an
Active Verification Management (AVM) approach that utilizes a checker hierarchy.
Based on a simplified queueing model, we evaluated the proposed AVM analytically.
In Chapter 4, before an instruction is verified at the checker processor, a bi-
nary correctness criticality based filter checker marks a Correctness Non-criticality
Indicator (CNI) bit to indicate how likely its result is to be unimportant for re-
liability. AVM uses the CNI information to realize a congestion avoidance policy.
Both reactive and proactive congestion avoidance policies are proposed to mitigate
the performance degradation caused by the checker’s congestion. Our experimental
results show that AVM has the potential to solve the verification congestion prob-
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lem when perfect fault coverage is not needed. With no AVM, congestion at the
checker badly affects performance, to the tune of 57%, when compared to that of
a non-fault-tolerant processor. With good marking by AVM, the performance of a
reliable processor approaches 95% of that of a processor with no verification. Al-
though instructions can be skipped on a random basis, such an approach reduces
the fault coverage. A result-usage-based filter checker with a marking policy cor-
related with the correctness non-criticality metric, on the other hand, significantly
reduces the soft error rate. We also presented results showing the trade-off between
performance and reliability.
Chapter 5 further improves the AVM by designing a result-bitwidth-based
filter checker, which prioritizes the verification candidates so as to selectively do
verification. Binary Correctness Criticality (BCC) and Likelihood of Correctness
Criticality (LoCC) are metrics that quantify whether an instruction is important
for reliability or how likely an instruction is correctness-critical, respectively. A like-
lihood of correctness criticality is computed by a value vulnerability factor, which
is defined by the numerically significant bit-width used to compute a result. The
result-bitwidth-based filter checker is accomplished by exploiting information redun-
dancy of compressing computationally useful data bits. Based on the likelihood of
correctness criticality test, the filter checker mitigates the verification workload by
bypassing instructions that are unimportant for correct execution. Extensive mea-
surements prove that the LoCC metric yields quite a wide distribution of values,
indicating that it has the potential to differentiate diverse degrees of correctness
criticality. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme accelerates a tradi-
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tional fully-fault-tolerant processor by 1.7 times, while it reduces the soft error rate
to 18% of that of a non-fault-tolerant processor.
Chapter 6 presents a result-anomaly-based filter checker to guide a verification
priority before the re-execution process starts. The anomaly speculation is accom-
plished by exploiting a value similarity property, which is defined by a frequent
occurrence of partially identical values. Based on the biased distribution of similar-
ity distance measure, we investigated further application to exploit similar values for
soft error tolerance with anomaly speculation. Extensive measurements prove that
the majority of instructions produce values which are different from the previous
result value only in a few bits. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme
accelerates the processor to be 180% faster than traditional fully-fault-tolerant pro-
cessor with a minimal impact on overall soft error rate.
Chapter 7 discusses overheads of the proposed filter checker on area, hard-
ware complexity, reliability and performance. We also discussed other potential
applications of the proposed active verification management techniques.
9.2 Future Direction
The challenge for computer architects is to improve the reliability of micro-
processor while maintaining its performance. My current research has addressed
this problem by developing an active verification management methodology for re-
liable microprocessors and has investigated its performance and reliability. In this
dissertation, we show that our AVM approach is very effective in achieving low
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hardware overhead, low performance overhead, and good fault coverage, compared
to traditional fault-tolerant techniques. We believe that the idea presented in this
dissertation can be extended to wider range of problems.
Based on the success of my current research, I foresee expanding this work into
several related areas and this line of research has broad relevance for other areas of
computer architectures and embedded systems, including:
• Reliability in soft computing:
• Power-efficient dynamic verification:
• Model-based design and its assurance in FPGA/Firmware/Software:
• Dynamic cache coherence technology in multi-core microprocessors:
• CPU resource management technology:
Finally, while the contributions of my dissertation are mostly for CPU proces-
sors, one of projected research I expect is to connect our verification methodology
with model-based design technologies, particularly in the implementation of FPGA,
Firmware and Software areas. The emergence of the new generation of complex
FPGAs/ASICs with embedded processors, memories, and DSP blocks reformulates
the design process as well as the nature of FPGA/Firmware/Software implemen-
tation verification. Thus, applying the design for testability and the methodology
for reliability concepts to FPGA/Firmware/Software are critical for achieving early
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